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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis contains three essays which are all from the broader field of the theories
on competition, collusion and antitrust enforcement. The chapters can be read in-
dependently, although there is a certain connection between the articles. The essays
in Chapter 2 and 3 provide models where firms try to sustain horizontal collusive
agreements under the review of an antitrust authority. Chapter 4 extends the topic to
vertical integration, where firms interact in a vertical merger game under the review
of an antitrust authority. The thesis is organized as follows:
The essay in Chapter 2 : The impact of antitrust policy on collusion with
imperfect monitoring deals with information spillovers between the antitrust au-
thority and collusive firms in an environment of imperfect information. The model
investigates how the sustainability of collusive agreements in uncertain environments
is affected by an antitrust authority that shares information with firms and by an
authority that keeps the information secret. The model investigates the impact of
antitrust enforcement by the means of fines in combination with these different infor-
mation policies. Using a model along the lines of Green and Porter (1984), it is
shown that fines increase the sustainability of collusion in industries with relatively
low probability of demand shocks. Moreover, even in situations where collusion is
sustainable without antitrust enforcement, introducing a fine reduces welfare. In addi-
tion, information spillovers from the antitrust authority to the colluding firms reinforce
1
2the effect of fines on collusion and enable even industries facing a high probability of
demand shocks to collude. The analysis partly involves leniency programs. These pro-
grams were introduced by antitrust authorities to reduce the fines against colluding
firms that report information about their cartel partners to the antitrust authority
and helped thereby to punish other cartel members. Making use of results from the
analysis of the information spillovers, the effect of leniency programs is investigated. It
is shown that leniency programs have ambiguous consequences on the sustainability of
collusion. On the one hand, the program has a weak positive effect in industries with
low probability of demand shocks, since it reduces the fine that is needed by the firms
to sustain collusion. Since leniency reduces the costs for getting information about
rivals price setting, leniency programs have an adverse effect however. This is due to
the fact that firms with a high probability of demand shocks need this information to
sustain collusion.1
The subsequent essay in Chapter 3 focuses on The deterrence effect of ex-
cluding ringleaders from leniency programs. In particular, the model inves-
tigates if ringleaders of cartels should be eligible for a fine reduction when cooperating
with the antitrust authority or whether they should be excluded from such programs.
Both approaches can be found in antitrust laws. For instance, the leniency program
established in the US law in 1978, stipulates that it is not possible for ringleaders to ob-
tain a fine reduction through leniency. However, due to the changes in the EU leniency
regulations in 2002 and 2006, ringleaders have the possibility to participate in such
1This essay was partly written during a research stay at the Midi-Pyre´ne´es School of Economics
(M.P.S.E.) in Toulouse. I am grateful to the financial support of the German Academic Exchange
Service (DAAD) during this project. Furthermore, I wish to thank Achim Wambach, who is a co-
author of this article, for many fruitful discussions. Versions of the model have been presented on the
RGS Doctoral Conference in Economics at the University of Dortmund, the 3rd annual Competition &
Regulation Meeting - Strategic Firm-Authority Interaction in Antitrust, Merger Control and Regulation
at the University of Amsterdam, the Augustin Cournot Doctoral Days 2007 at the Universite´ Louis
Pasteur in Strasbourg, the 1st Conference of the Research Network on Innovation and Competition
Policy: Modern Approaches in Competition Policy at the Centre for European Economic Research
(ZEW) in Mannheim, the 2007 Annual Meeting of the German Economic Association at the University
of Munich, the 1st Doctoral Meeting of Montpellier at the University of Montpellier 1, the 4th IUE
International Student Conference: Cooperation, Coordination and Conflict at the Izmir University of
Economics, the XIII. Spring Meeting of Young Economists at the University of Lille 2, and on the 6th
Annual International Industrial Organization Conference at the Marymount University.
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a program in Europe. The model in this essay looks at the implications of excluding
ringleaders from leniency programs for the sustainability of collusion. On the one hand,
it is shown that excluding ringleaders decreases the sustainability of collusion by for-
going the information of an additional potential whistleblower means for the antitrust
authority. On the other hand, a ringleader will request from the other cartel members
a compensation for not being able to apply for leniency. Such a compensation, how-
ever, results in an asymmetry between the ringleader and the ordinary cartel members
which destabilizes collusion. Compared to the legal environment where ringleaders are
eligible for leniency, excluding the ringleader reduces the cartel activity if the effect
of asymmetry outweighs the two collusion-enhancing effects of ringleader discrimina-
tion: first, the effect of a decreasing probability that the antitrust authority is able to
convict the cartel and secondly the effect of a reduced number of firms competing in
the “race to report”. It is shown that if the probability that an antitrust authority
investigates an industry is low, excluding ringleaders from leniency programs increases
the sustainability of collusion. If the probability of review is high, an exclusion may
decrease the sustainability.2
The model in Chapter 4 is about Vertical integration and (horizontal)
side-payments. It analyzes the emerging of an asymmetrically vertical integrated
market structures when side-payments among firms are feasible. For instance, side-
payments have been observed during the vertical merger process of E.ON and Ruhrgas
– two major players on the first two tiers of the German natural gas market – in 2003,
where E.ON payed around 90 million Euros to its competitors to stop a lawsuit against
the merger. The model investigates how side-payments can be crucial to explain the
development of a market structure where a vertically integrated firm co-exists with sep-
arated competitors in a successive duopoly. By assuming backward integration, it is
2I would like to thank my co-author of this essay, Alexander Rasch, for many and very fruitful
discussions on this topic. Furthermore, I wish to thank the participants of the Research Seminar in
Applied Microeconomics at the University of Cologne, especially Oliver Gu¨rtler, Axel Ockenfels, and
Dirk Sliwka for helpful remarks on a very early version of this model. The model has been presented
on the 35th Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics at the
Toulouse School of Economics and it is accepted for presentation on the 2009 Annual Conference of
the Royal Economic Society at the University of Surrey and on the 7th Annual International Industrial
Organization Conference at the Northeastern University.
4shown that a downstream firm can prevent counter-mergers of its rivals by transferring
side-payments to them. However, an integrated downstream unit will never transfer
side-payments to a separated upstream firm, since this would decrease its profits. Fur-
thermore it is argued that antitrust authorities may allow for such side-payments, since
they may increase the overall welfare compared to a market structure where all firms
are separated. However, if firms would be willing to integrate without side-payments
anyway, allowing for side-payments detains a market structure of full integration. A
market where all firms are integrated results, however, in a higher welfare compared
to a partially integrated market. Hence, a ban on side-payments would then result in
an increase in welfare.3
Finally, in the concluding remarks in Chapter 5 the results of the presented essays
are summarized.
3I would like to thank Andreas Engel, Alexander Rasch, and Achim Wambach for very fruitful
discussions, especially on the timing of the game.
Chapter 2
The impact of antitrust policy on
collusion with imperfect monitoring
2.1 Introduction
Starting with Becker (1968) there has been a large debate in the literature on the
impacts and the optimal adjustments of antitrust rules. In recent years the economic
effect of the interaction of antitrust authorities and firms is still one major topic of the
economic discussion on antitrust enforcement. One reason for this is the introduction
of leniency programs in 1978 in the United States and later in 1996 in the European
Union.4 Leniency programs were implemented to increase the conviction rate of cartels
by decreasing the information asymmetries between the antitrust authority and the
firms. They seem to have indeed the desired effect. E.g. Brenner (2005) andArlman
(2005) report that the number of decisions on cartels in the European Union has
increased substantially after the introduction of leniency in 1996 from 15 cases in the
period from 1990 to 1995, to 38 cases from 1996 to 2003.5 Since sharing of information
4These programs were introduced to give colluding firms incentives – by reducing the fines against
these firms – to report information about the cartel to the antitrust authority and thus helping to
punish other cartel members. For a detailed overview see Spagnolo (2007).
5However, it is not clear whether this increase is due to the effectiveness of the leniency program
in encouraging whistle blowing or due to an increase in cartel activity. This problem will be discussed
in Section 2.5.
5
6seem to be a crucial component for the success of antitrust enforcements, developing a
model with regard to antitrust authorities and firm interaction requires necessarily to
model informational problems and spillovers of information. This essay takes account
of those considerations.
While the literature on leniency programs has only focused on the information
spillovers from firms to the antitrust authority so far, this work deals with an envi-
ronment where the opposite information flow direction – from the antitrust authority
to the firms – becomes relevant.6 These information spillovers are the focus of the
first part of this essay. In the second part the results from the first part are used to
investigate the effectiveness of leniency programs in uncertain environments.
In the model an antitrust authority is assumed to decide on the size of the fine for
collusive behavior, whether information during the antitrust procedure will be disclosed
or not and whether leniency is granted or not. Firms attempt to collude in a market
with uncertain demand, but observe only their individual demand. Using a model
along the lines of Green and Porter (1984), it is shown that the effect of leniency
programs is ambiguous, since the program has a weakly positive effect in industries with
low probability of demand shocks and an adverse effect if the probability of demand
shocks is high. Leniency unambiguously increases the number of prosecuted cartel
cases, however.
Similar to previous literature it is found that fines can increase the sustainability
of collusion, but only in industries with a relatively low probability of demand shocks.
Information spillovers from the antitrust authority to the colluding firms reinforce the
effect of fines on collusion and enable industries to collude even when they face a high
probability of demand shocks. In all cases, fines unambiguously reduce welfare, even
6The regulations for the access to information during prosecution is given by the Commission No-
tice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ C 298/11, 8.12.2006, paragraphs
31–35) in conjunction with the Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in
cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement
and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (OJ C 325/7, 22.12.2005, paragraph 7). Paragraph 7 says:
“[...] access [to the files] is granted, upon request, to the persons, undertakings or associations of un-
dertakings, as the case may be, to which the Commission addresses its objections [...]”. Consequently
all cartel members may have access to the information the rival’s have revealed (e.g. effective demand
or price setting).
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in situations where collusion would have been sustainable without fines.
The intuition for these results is as follows: That fines can be used as a threat to
sustain collusion in an uncertain environment has already been shown by Cyrenne
(1999). Interestingly, this works only if the probability of demand shocks is relatively
low. For a high probability of demand shocks, the introduction of a fine does not
make collusion more stable, because the fine would have to be paid too often and
collusion would never be profitable. In the standard Green Porter model temporary
price wars in equilibrium are required to support collusion. By substituting the fine
for these price wars, consumers are worse off, as the number of periods where collusion
takes place increases. Thus, welfare will be reduced. Informational disclosure by the
antitrust authority allows the firm to learn about the behavior of their competitors.
As this information is costly (the fine has to be paid), the model works along the lines
of the literature on costly private monitoring (see e.g. Compte (1998), Kandori and
Matsushima (2003), Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003), and Martin (2006)). If
discounting is not too strong, the ability to monitor the competitors allows firms to
collude, even in industries with a high probability of demand shocks. Finally, leniency
in this model has the effect of reducing the expected fine. While for a low probability
of demand shocks, a larger fine is useful in sustaining collusion, for a high probability
of demand shocks it is the lower fine (which implies cheaper costly monitoring) which
encourages collusion. Thus, leniency works in both directions. That antitrust policy
can have the perverse effect of making collusion more stable is also shown by Cyrenne
(1999), Spagnolo (2000), Harrington (2004a), Harrington (2004b), and Chen
and Harrington (2007) also.
The model developed here contributes to the literature where information disclo-
sure by the government influences market behavior. There exist several other ex-
amples where governmental institutions helped industries to sustain collusive pricing.
Alexander (1994) shows that the National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA) between
1933 and 1935, which was introduced in the USA to stop price deflation and bankrupt-
cies during the Depression, increased the concentration level of industries. Levenstein
8(1995) analyzes the price-enhancing effect of publishing firm specific transaction prices
by the government in the American salt industry in the late nineteenth century. Sim-
ilar effects are found by Albeak, Mollgard, and Overgaard (1997) who analyze
the price path of the Danish concrete industry and find an increase of prices during a
period of price publishing by the Danish antitrust authority.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 the specifications of the model
and – as a benchmark – the standard model without an antitrust authority are pre-
sented. In Section 2.3 the impact of fines on the possibility of firms to sustain collusive
agreements is analyzed. In Section 2.4 the model it extended by an information dis-
closure policy and in Section 2.5 by a leniency programs. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
The analysis of infinitely repeated games under imperfect monitoring follows the model
discussed by Tirole (1988), based on Green and Porter (1984).7 Tirole’s model
is extended to allow for an antitrust authority which can punish firms for collusive
behavior.
2.2.1 Players
i. Firms
There are two firms in an industry, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}. Firms compete in prices for
an infinite number of periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..,∞} and produce a homogeneous product
at constant marginal costs c > 0. In every period t, firm i sets the price pti and observes
its own demand Dti and profit Π
t
i, but neither the rival’s price p
t
j nor demand D
t
j nor
profit Πtj (with j 6= i).
7For a concise description of the original model see Tirole (1988), pp. 262-264.
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ii. Nature
The market demand Dk (k ∈ {l, h}) is stochastic and chosen by nature. Two states
of demand are possible: With probability 1− α, with α ∈ (0, 1) the market demand is
strictly positive Dh = D(p) (high-demand state). With probability α a demand shock
accrues and market demand is zero Dl = 0, (low-demand state). The state of demand
can not be observed by the firms directly.
To allow for correlated strategies later on, nature also chooses a random uniformly
distributed signal s ∈ [0, 1] which can be perfectly observed by the firms.
iii. Antitrust authority
The antitrust authority implements a law enforcement policy, which consists of an ex-
ogenously given lump-sum fine F ∈ [0,∞), possibly a leniency program and rules for
information allocation. The fines have to be paid by the firms that are investigated
and proven guilty with respect to collusive behavior. The success of an investigation
depends on information about the collusion. It is assumed that this essential infor-
mation can be revealed to the antitrust authority through whistleblowing by the firms
only. Thus, if no firm does whistleblowing, the probability that the antitrust author-
ity successfully proves firms guilty is equal to zero.8 Otherwise, if at least one firm
blows the whistle, the antitrust authority will investigate the industry, convict firm i
of collusion if it observes pti > c in the current investigation period.
9
To analyze the impact of different strategies of the antitrust authority the following
policies will be discussed:
8This assumption is made for simplicity. It can be justified by invoking a budget-constraint for
the antitrust authority and sufficiently high investigation costs. As a result, the antitrust authority
would never investigate the industry without information from at least one firm. The assumption
of a budget-constrained antitrust authority has also been made by Motta and Polo (2003) and
Martin (2006). After the cartel case “Raw Tobacco Italy” (Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2) in October
2005, where a 50% (and 30% respectively) reduction of the actually fines where guaranteed to two
cartel members, all decisions thereafter seem to have been based on essential information submitted
by least one cartel member, since all decisions have seen full leniency (reduction of fine amounting to
100%) for one cartel member.
9As in Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006) it is assumed that the antitrust authority only considers
current period prices.
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Information Policy: There are two possible information policies. In the first case,
antitrust authority uses the revealed information to convict firms, but does not
reveal the price setting of a firm to its rival. In the second case, the antitrust
authority discloses the price setting in period t and informs each firm i about
the price ptj of its rival. Denote by {nd, d} the antitrust authority’s set of op-
tions, where {nd} stands for a non-disclosing and {d} for a disclosing antitrust
authority.
Leniency Policy: If no leniency program is in place, colluding firms have to pay a
fine F , independent of whether a firm was helping the antitrust authority by
blowing the whistle or not. If a leniency program is installed, the whistleblowing
firm has to pay a reduced fine R = (1− r)F (with r > 0). Denote by {nl, l} the
antitrust authority’s set of options, where {nl} stands for no leniency and {l}
for leniency.
The fine F , the set of policies {d, nd} and {l, nl} are fixed before the firms start
interacting.
The existence of a fine (full or reduced) and the policy of disclosing information ex-
tend the strategy space of the firms compared with the firms in Tirole’s model by
two important aspects: First, by the possibility to use a new punishment tool (fine)
provided by the antitrust authority.10 And second, the possibility to obtain (formerly)
private information by blowing the whistle. This second aspect changes the collusive
game from collusion under imperfect monitoring to a collusive game where monitoring
is possible, but costly. The resulting changes in the structure of the game and in the
firms’ strategies are described in the following subsections.
10This aspect has also been discussed by Cyrenne (1999), who added a lump sum fine to the model
of Green and Porter (1984).
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2.2.2 Timing of the game
In period t = 0 the legal environment is defined: The antitrust authority sets the law
enforcement policy parameters. It chooses a lump-sum fine F , commits to disclose
the prices after investigation {d} or not {nd} and introduces leniency programs {l} or
not {nl}. The pricing game proceeds in period t = 1, 2, ... and every period has the
following structure:
Stage 1 : Firms choose prices pti ∈ [c, pM(c)].
Stage 2 : Nature chooses the market demand Dt and the signal st.
If Dt > 0, customers go to the firm with the lower price.
In case both firms charges the same price, customers split
equally between the firms.
Stage 3 : Each firm i observes its own demand Dti with i ∈ {1, 2} and
the signal st, and obtains its profit Πti. After that, each firm
decides whether to blow the whistle or not. If no firm has
chosen whistleblowing the game restarts at Stage 1 in the
next period t+ 1. If at least one firm has blown the whistle,
the game enters Stage 4.
Stage 4 : The industry will be investigated by the antitrust authority.
The authority observes the price setting of each firm i. If
price pti, with i ∈ {1, 2}, has exceeded c, firm i is convicted
of collusion and has to pay the fine F (or the reduced fine R).
Depending on the information policy commitment in t = 0,
price pti i ∈ {1, 2} becomes public if {d} was chosen or stays
private knowledge for each firm {nd}. After that the game
restarts at Stage 1 in the next period t+ 1.
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2.2.3 Firms’ strategies
In order to sustain the collusive agreement while rival’s price setting can not be ob-
served directly, firms have to use a punishment mechanism which is independent of
direct observation. In Tirole’s model the only way of punishment is a price war of
finite duration for T periods. In this model firms are able to choose between (or com-
bine) punishment by a price war for T periods and the fine punishment. Thus, two
different collusive strategies are analyzed, where in line with the literature on modeling
collusion in a dynamic framework, the model concentrates on Markov strategies.11
TP (Temporary Punishment) This is the standard strategy firms play in Tirole’s
model without an antitrust authority. Firms collude from t = 1 on. If in period
t neither deviation from pti = p
M nor a demand shock occurs, each firm realizes
a profit of Πti =
1
2
ΠM at the end of the period. If in period t the demand of at
least one firm is zero, firms start in t+ 1 a price war of T periods. In t+ 1 + T ,
they revert to collusion.
TFP (Temporary and Fine Punishment) This is a combination of punishment
by price war and fine punishment provided by the antitrust authority. Again,
firms collude from t = 1 on. If in period t no deviation from pti = p
M or a
demand shock occurs, each firm realizes a profit of Πti =
1
2
ΠM at the end of
the period. If in period t the demand of at least one firm is zero, firms blow
the whistle with probability γ and reveal information to the antitrust authority.
Furthermore, firms start in t+ 1 a price war for T γ periods. In t+ 1 + T γ, they
revert to collusion. With probability 1 − γ no firm does whistleblowing, but a
price war of T ′ periods is started in the next period. In t + 1 + T ′ firms revert
to collusion. If a deviation from the equilibrium TFP strategy occurs, firms play
”grim trigger” [Friedman (1971)], a price war with pti = c and profits Π
t
i = 0 in
every following period.
11For details see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) pp. 501 et sqq.
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2.2.4 Benchmark
First the benchmark case similar to Tirole (1988) – where no antitrust authority
exists – is described. Firms choose a price equal to the monopoly price pM in period
t = 1. In doing so, each firm receives half of the monopoly profit in a high-demand
state, Πh,ti =
1
2
ΠM and no profit in low-demand state, Πl,ti = 0. A firm that unilaterally
defects from pt = pM attracts in a high-demand state the whole market and gets the
monopoly profit ΠM . In the punishment phase which occurs after a low-demand state
or when a firm has deviated, firms set pt = c for T -periods and hence obtain in each
period Πk,ti = 0. Let V
+ denote the firm value in period t when the game is in a
collusive phase. Let δ be the discount factor which is the same for each firm, with
0 ≤ δ < 1. Then it holds:
V + = (1− α)
(
1
2
ΠM + δV +
)
+ α(0 + δT+1V +) (2.1)
The first term of equation (2.1) reflects that in each high-demand state firms get the
collusive profit. The second term shows that in a low-demand state, profits are equal
to zero and a phase of a T -period price war will be started.
If one firm unilaterally defects from the collusion, its firm value is:
V D = (1− α) (ΠM + δT+1V +)+ α(0 + δT+1V +). (2.2)
The first term of equation (2.2) reflects that a deviating firm gets the whole monopoly
profit in a high-demand state. However, since its rival observes no demand in this
period this triggers a price war of T periods. While the interpretation of the second
term is equal to equation (2.1).
It is obvious that firms have an incentive to collude if the firm value of a colluding
firm V + is weakly larger than the firm value of a defecting firm, V D. Thus, V + ≥ V D
gives the following condition:
(δ − δT+1)V + ≥ 1
2
ΠM . (2.3)
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Condition (2.3) can be denoted as incentive compatibility constraint (IC), since the
increase of the firm value by sticking to the collusion in period t has to be weakly larger
than the additional profit 1
2
ΠM from defecting in a high-demand state.
From equation (2.1) the firm value resulting from collusion can be determined:
V + =
1
2
ΠM
(
(1− α)
1− δ + α(δ − δT+1)
)
. (2.4)
Thus, the IC, condition (2.3), amounts to
1
2
ΠM
(
(δ − δT+1)(1− α)
1− δ + α(δ − δT+1)
)
≥ 1
2
ΠM (2.5)
which can be reduced to
(1− 2α)(δ − δT+1)− (1− δ) ≥ 0. (2.6)
From inequality (2.6) it is obvious that collusion is an equilibrium if, for a given α, δ
is not too small: δ ∈ [δ(α), 1), or if, for a given δ, α is not too large: α ∈ [0, α(δ)].
The resulting critical parameters are described by Tirole (1988). In order to make
the results comparable to the results in the following sections, the following lemma
summarizes:
Lemma 2.1 In absence of an antitrust authority, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists
in which firms collude by using a temporary price war as punishment if
(i) α ≤ 1− 1
2δ
≤ 1
2
or equivalently
(ii) δ ≥ 1
2(1−α) ≥ 12
Proof From inequality (2.6) it follows directly that the IC can not be satisfied if
α > 1
2
holds. So it is sufficient to consider the case α ≤ 1
2
. As ∂IC
∂α
≤ 0, ∂IC
∂δ
≥ 0, and
∂IC
∂T
= −(1− 2α)δT+1 ln(δ) ≥ 0 for α ≤ 1
2
, to calculate the minimal δ (maximal α) we
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set T → ∞. Thus IC ≥ 0 changes to ICT→∞ = 2δ(1 − α) − 1 ≥ 0 which holds if
δ ≥ 1
2(1−α) or equivalently α ≤ 1− 12δ. 
A specific industry is defined as two firms producing the same product under the
same cost structure and the same market conditions. These conditions are reflected
by the industry-specific α and δ. The curve in Figure 2.1 displays the boundary of
industries where collusion is sustainable. Industries which are located in the hatched
area left to the curve are the candidates for collusive activities using TP.
(0,0) (1,0)
(1,1)(0,1)
α
δ
Figure 2.1: Sustainable collusion by the use of the TP strategy
The optimal strategy of firms using TP is easy to see. From inequality (2.3) it
follows, that collusion is more likely to be stable if T is large. On the other hand,
equation (2.4) implies ∂V
+
∂T
≤ 0. Thus, to maximize the collusive firm value, firms
have to coordinate on a minimal T which is high enough to satisfy the IC. Thus, the
optimization problem becomes:
min T ≡ argmaxV + (2.7)
s.t.
(1− 2α)(δ − δT+1)− (1− δ) ≥ 0
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2.3 The non-disclosing antitrust authority
Now the antitrust authority is added to the benchmark model. The antitrust authority
commits to a lump sum fine F ∈ [0,∞) in period t = 0, no leniency program exists,
{nl}, and the antitrust authority chooses a non-disclosing policy, {nd}. Thus, firms do
not obtain any information about the price setting of its rival if they are investigated.
As a result, they are again not informed about the reason when observing zero demand,
independent of whether a firm blows the whistle or not.
If firms use the TP strategy no firm does whistleblowing in equilibrium and the
outcome of the analysis is the same as in the benchmark. Thus, only the conditions
for the TFP strategy have to be analyzed: If a firm faces no profit, it blows the whistle
with probability γ. To coordinate on a certain frequency of whistleblowing, firms use
the signal st provided in every period t. Only if st ≤ γ firms will in equilibrium (jointly)
blow the whistle.
Recalling that the TFP strategy specifies that firms, given they observe zero de-
mand, undertake a price war of T γ (T ′) periods if they blow (do not blow) the whistle,
the values of the firms under collusion and deviation12 can be calculated:
V + = (1− α)
(
1
2
ΠM + δV +
)
+ α
(
γ
[−F + δT γ+1V +]+ (1− γ)δT ′+1V +
)
(2.8)
and
V D = (1− α)
(
ΠM + γ
[−F + δT γ+1V +]+ (1− γ)δT ′+1V +
)
+
+ α
(
γ
[−F + δT γ+1V +]+ (1− γ)δT ′+1V +
)
. (2.9)
To sustain collusion, the new IC, V + ≥ V D, has to hold again. Consequently, it turns
out that (
δ −
[
γδT
γ+1 + (1− γ)δT ′+1
])
V + ≥ 1
2
ΠM − γF. (2.10)
12Note that if firm i deviates from the collusive strategy, it is indifferent in blowing the whistle with
probability γ or not since firm j would do whistleblowing anyway.
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The term in the angled brackets γδT
γ+1+(1−γ)δT ′+1 can be interpreted as the effective
reduction of firm value due to periods of price wars. This reduction will be denoted by
δ
eff
nd ≡ γδT
γ+1 + (1− γ)δT ′+1. (2.11)
Thus, inequality (2.10) changes to
(
δ − δeffnd
)
V + ≥ 1
2
ΠM − γF. (2.12)
Compared to the corresponding inequality in the benchmark (2.3), the left hand side of
inequality (2.12) represents again the difference of firm values in a high-demand state
between staying in the collusion and after a deviation induced price war. Which is
thus equal to the expected costs of defecting. While the right hand side is again the
additional profit from defecting in a high-demand state, in this case reduced by the
expected fine a deviating firm has to pay. To determine the range of parameters where
collusion is stable equation (2.8) is rearranged to give
V + =
(1− α)ΠM − 2αγF
2[1− δ + α(δ − δeffnd )]
. (2.13)
By inserting (2.13) into condition (2.12), V + ≥ V D holds if:
(1− 2α)
(
δ − δeffnd
)
+
(
γ
2F
ΠM
− 1
)
(1− δ) ≥ 0. (2.14)
Whether the IC, condition (2.12), holds or not depends on the exogenous parameters α
and δ but, compared with the benchmark, additionally on the term 2F
ΠM
. This parameter
is the ratio of the fine F and half of the monopoly profit 1
2
ΠM , the additional profit
from defecting in a high-demand state. Let φ = 2F
Π
be the fine/profit-ratio. Thus the
IC reduces to:
(1− 2α)
(
δ − δeffnd
)
+ (γφ− 1)(1− δ) ≥ 0 (2.15)
By choosing the length of the punishment phases T γ, T ′ ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}, firms can again
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choose the effective reduction of the firm value after a price war, δeffnd . Additionally
they can choose the expected payment to the antitrust authority, γF , by choosing the
frequency of blowing the whistle, γ ∈ [0, 1]. From inequality (2.15) it follows that for
γφ ≥ 1, firms do not need a reduction of firm value by choosing a δeffnd to sustain collu-
sion, as the IC holds anyway. However, from equation (2.13), using that 2F = φΠM ,
it can be seen that for a large expected fine/profit-ratio, γφ, and a high probability
of demand shocks α, V + may become negative. Therefore, an additional constraint,
V + ≥ 0 has to be added. This condition can be called participation constraint (PC),
as it reflects the fact that firms have to obtain at least non-negative firm value from
collusion. Since the denominator of expression (2.13) never turns negative the PC can
be written as:
(1− α)− αγφ ≥ 0. (2.16)
The condition for the existence of a collusive equilibrium is given in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.2 For F > 0, {nd}, and {nl} a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists where
firms collude by using the TFP strategy if
(i)
α ≤


1− 1−(1−δ)φ
2δ
if φ < 1
1
2
if φ ≥ 1
or equivalently
(ii)
δ ≥


1−φ
2(1−α)−φ if φ < 1
0 if φ ≥ 1
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Proof The PC, condition (2.16), is satisfied if and only if γ ≤ min
[
1, 1−α
αφ
]
.
From inequality (2.15) it follows that ∂IC
∂δ
eff
nd
= −(1 − 2α). To determine the border
cases, for α ≤ 1
2
we set δeffnd = 0 and for α >
1
2
we set δeffnd to its maximal value,
δ
eff
nd = δ. In both cases γ is also set to its maximum value.
Consider first the case α ≤ 1
2
: The IC then changes to (1−2α)δ+min [φ, 1−α
α
]−1)(1−
δ) ≥ 0. If φ ≥ 1−α
α
(≥ 1) the IC holds. If φ < 1−α
α
, the IC holds if α ≤ 1− 1−(1−δ)φ
2δ
or
δ ≥ 1−φ
2(1−α)−φ .
Next consider the case α > 1
2
: As the PC requires that γφ < 1 and the IC now reads
(γφ− 1)(1− δ) ≥ 0, one can see that both conditions can never hold simultaneously.
Compared with the benchmark case, the number of industries which are able to
sustain collusion is increasing in the fines provided by a non-disclosing antitrust au-
thority, since ∂α
∂φ
> 0 and ∂δ
∂φ
< 0. Figure 2.2 displays the boundaries for industries
where collusion can be sustained for different values of φ ≥ 0. All industries which are
located in the area left to the curves are able to use the TFP strategy in equilibrium.
(0,0) (1,0)
(1,1)(0,1)
δ
α
φ≥1
φ=0
φ→1
Figure 2.2: Sustainable Collusion under a regime of a non-disclosing antitrust au-
thority
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From comparing Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 it follows that if there is a non-
disclosing antitrust authority, even firms with a relatively low discount factor (δ < 1
2
)
can sustain collusion. On the other hand, as in the benchmark only firms which face a
demand shock with a relative low probability (α ≤ 1
2
) are able sustain collusion. The
results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1 Compared to a situation without an antitrust authority, introducing
a non-disclosing antitrust authority with policy F, {nd}, and {nl}
(i) leads to more collusive industries with α ≤ 1
2
,
(ii) has no effect on industries with α > 1
2
.
Proof The proof follows immediately from Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2. 
Next the welfare consequences of an antitrust authority are analyzed. First, allowing
for φ > 0 makes it possible for more industries to collude and leads to welfare losses
since prices are (in some periods) above marginal costs, at leat as demand is elastic.
Additionally, there is a second effect: Firms which are able to sustain collusion without
a fine, might now use the fine punishment instead of the price war punishment. As the
price war punishment brings with it a welfare gain due to marginal cost pricing for T
periods instead of monopoly prices, reverting to a fine punishment would lead to a loss
of welfare.
However, for this argument to hold through, it needs to be shown that firms indeed
use the fine punishment if they have the choice between the two instruments. From the
point of view of the firms it turns out that if collusion is sustainable both instruments
are perfectly substitutable if the IC binds.13 The result is shown in the following
lemma:
Lemma 2.3 Any combination of T ′, T γ, and γ such that the IC binds yields the same
collusive firm value, V +.
13At least if firms maximize their collusive profit, the IC will bind in equilibrium.
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Proof To keep the IC constant, a decrease in the frequency of whistleblowing (decrease
in γ) has to be compensated by a decrease of δeffnd , i.e.
dδ
eff
nd
dγ
= 2F (1−δ)
ΠM (1−2α) ≥ 0. The total
change in V + is given by: dV
+
dγ
= ∂V
+
∂δ
eff
nd
dδ
eff
nd
dγ
+ ∂V
+
∂γ
=
−α
2FΠM [(1−2α)(δ−δeffnd )+(γφ−1)(1−δ)]
(1−δ+α(δ−δeff
nd
))ΠM (1−2α) . This expression is zero as the term in brackets in the
numerator is just the IC, which is assumed to bind. 
Thus, all relevant parameters can be freely chosen by the firms or can be adapted
to any exogenous requirement without reducing the firm value.14
The results on the welfare consequences of an antitrust authority with a fine only
are summarized in the next Proposition:
Proposition 2.2 A fine reduces welfare through increasing the number of colluding
industries. Even if collusion is sustainable without a fine, introducing a fine will lead to
a reduction of welfare if firms blow the whistle with positive probability in equilibrium.
Proof The first result immediately follows from Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2. For the
second result, it still needs to be shown that the new combination of fine and price
wars (i.e. T γ, T ′ instead of T ) indeed leads to a reduction in welfare. Denote by ∆ the
welfare gain per period of price war. The expected welfare gain through price wars is
then given by
E[∆] = γ
T γ∑
i=1
δi∆+ (1− γ)
T ′∑
i=1
δi∆ (2.17)
= γ
(δ − δT γ+1)
1− δ ∆+ (1− γ)
(δ − δT ′+1)
1− δ ∆ (2.18)
=
∆
1− δ
[
δ −
(
γδT
γ+1 + (1− γ)δT ′+1
)]
(2.19)
=
∆
1− δ
[
δ − δeffnd
]
(2.20)
The benchmark is represented by γ = 0. From Lemma 2.2 it is known that
∂δ
eff
nd
∂γ
=
14An example for such a requirement could be, that firms have to make detailed reports about their
activities for some periods after proven guilty for collusion (T γ ≥ T ). E.g. Motta and Polo (2003)
introduced such a requirement in their model. They assume that firms have to interrupt the collusion
for one period after the investigation of the antitrust authority.
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φ(1−δ)
1−2α ≥ 0. Since ∂E[∆]∂δeff
nd
< 0, any γ > 0 reduces welfare. 
2.4 The disclosing antitrust authority
Now the model is extended to analyze the effects of information spillovers from the
antitrust authority to the colluding firms. If the antitrust authority informs each firm
about the price of its rival in the current period t (commits to {d} and F > 0 in t = 0),
firms are able to monitor each other through whistleblowing. If colluding firms blow
the whistle and observe that no firm has deviated they can immediately go back to
collusion. There is no need to punish the other by starting a price war. On the other
hand, if it is observed that one firm has deviated this will trigger the breakdown of
collusion, thus price equal marginal costs would be set in every period thereafter.
The firm value from collusion is therefore given by
V + = (1− α)
(
1
2
ΠM + δV +
)
+ α
(
γ
[−F + δV +]+ (1− γ)δT ′+1V +
)
(2.21)
and the value of a firm which deviates is
V D = (1− α)
(
ΠM + γ [−F ] + (1− γ)
[
δT
′+1V +
])
+
+ α
(
γ [−F ] + (1− γ)δT ′+1V +
)
. (2.22)
Compared to equations (2.8) and (2.9) under a non-disclosing antitrust authority,
there are two relevant modifications in the corresponding equations (2.21) and (2.22).
First, the firm value from collusion, V +, is increased by αγ(δ − δT γ+1)V +: If firms
blow the whistle, they are assured that the absence of demand was induced by nature.
Thus, they are able to revert to collusion immediately if the antitrust authority informs
them that deviation did not take place. Second, in the expression for the firm value
from deviation, V D, the term γδT
γ+1V + is missing. After a deviation is detected (with
probability γ) there is no return to the collusive outcome (in effect T γ =∞). In analogy
with the analysis of a non-disclosing antitrust authority the effective reduction of firm
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value when firms stick to the collusive strategy is defined by:
δ
eff
d ≡ γδ + (1− γ)δT
′+1. (2.23)
Proceeding as before and using definition (2.23) equation (2.21) can be simplified to:
V + =
(1− α)ΠM − 2αγF
2
[
1− δ + α
(
δ − δeffd
)] . (2.24)
Both changes in the firms values and the definition of δeffd lead to the new IC:
(
δ − δeffd +
1
1− αγδ
)
V + ≥ 1
2
ΠM − γF (2.25)
The left hand side of inequality (2.25) represents again the difference of firm value
between staying in the collusion and after a deviation induced price war. While the
right hand side is again the additional profit from defecting in a high-demand state
and its reduction by the expected fine a deviating firm has to pay. The first effect
of a disclosing policy is given by T γ = 0 in δeffd . The second effect can be found in
the positive term 1
1−αγδV
+. This term reflects that a deviating firm has to forgo any
additional collusive profits with probability γ. While in the benchmark and under a
non-disclosing policy the costs and benefits from defecting are only relevant in a high-
demand state, now the costs of defecting have to be borne additionally in a low-demand
state. Thus the term is scaled by dividing through 1− α.
Plugging (2.24) into (2.25) and using φ = 2F
ΠM
, the IC changes to
(1− 2α)
(
δ − δeffd
)
+ (γφ− 1) (1− (1− γ)δ) + 1
1− αγδ (2(1− α)− γφ) ≥ 0. (2.26)
As before, the PC, V + ≥ 0, has to be considered as well. Again, the denominator of
inequality (2.24) never turns negative. Thus, the PC can be written as before:
(1− α)− αγφ ≥ 0. (2.27)
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The condition for the existence of a collusive equilibrium is shown in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.4 For F > 0, {d}, and {nl} a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where firms
collude exists if
(i)
α ≤


1− 1−(1−δ)φ−(1−φ)
2δ−(1−φ) if
φ−1
φ−2 ≤ δ ≤ φ−2φ−3 and φ < 1
((1−δ)φ+δ)2
((1−δ)φ+δ)2+4δ(1−δ)φ if δ >
φ−2
φ−3 and φ < 1
α ≤


1
2
if δ ≤ φ
1+φ
and φ ≥ 1
((1−δ)φ+δ)2
((1−δ)φ+δ)2+4δ(1−δ)φ if δ >
φ
1+φ
and φ ≥ 1
or equivalently
(ii)
δ ≥


(1−α)(1−φ)
2(1−α)−φ if α <
1
1+2φ−φ2 and φ < 1
((3α−1)+(1−α)φ+2
√
2α2−α)φ
[2(3α−1)+(1−α)φ]φ+(1−α) if α ≥ 11+2φ−φ2 and φ < 1
δ ≥


0 if α ≤ 1
2
and φ ≥ 1
((3α−1)+(1−α)φ+2
√
2α2−α)φ
[2(3α−1)+(1−α)φ]φ+(1−α) if α >
1
2
and φ ≥ 1
Proof The proof is delegated to the appendix (see A.1.1 ). 
Lemma 2.4 shows that even for α > 1
2
collusion might be possible if the antitrust
authority reveals information. The intuition for this can be most easily seen by assum-
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ing that the fine is zero, i.e. φ = 0.15 In this case whistleblowing is costless and the
situation is as in an environment with perfect monitoring. Thus, the standard result
for collusion of two firms is obtained: for all α ≤ 1 collusion can be sustained as long
as δ ≥ 1
2
.
Moreover, Lemma 2.4 shows that if the probability of demand shocks is relatively
low (α ≤ 1
2
), the results are similar to the case of a regime of a non-disclosing antitrust
authority: The number of industries which can sustain collusion is increasing in φ.
However, as can be seen below, the overall range of parameters where collusion is
possible is enlarged.
As before, if φ ≥ 1 all industries, with α ≤ 1
2
and δ ≥ 0 can sustain collusion. If,
in contrast, the probability of demand shocks is relatively high, (α > 1
2
), the number
of industries which can sustain collusion is decreasing in φ and sustainable collusion
requires a larger δ if the fine/profit-ratio is increasing.16 The limit, φ→∞, is equal to
an environment of an non-disclosing antitrust authority where no industry with α > 1
2
is able to sustain collusion. Figure 2.3 displays the boundaries for sustainable collusion
for any given φ ≥ 0. All industries in the areas left (and above) the curves are able to
sustain collusion with the TFP strategy.
15A zero expected fine might even be a realistic assumption to be made if proposals of a reward for
whistleblowing go through. See the next section for a discussion.
16These results are in the line with Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) who show that if perfect
monitoring is possible, and even when the costs of monitoring are high, every payoff vector which is an
interior point in the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs can be implemented in a repeated
game if the discount factor is high enough.
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Figure 2.3: Sustainable Collusion under a regime of a disclosing antitrust authority
To compare between the outcomes of Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.4, the two cases
α > 1
2
and α ≤ 1
2
will be discussed in turn. If the probability of a demand shock
is relatively high, α > 1
2
, industries are able to sustain collusion only if the antitrust
authority commits to {d} in t = 0. If the probability of a demand shock is relatively
low, α ≤ 1
2
, for any φ < 1, then the critical discount rate where collusion can barley
be sustained for a given φ is weakly lower for a disclosing than for a non-disclosing
antitrust authority.17 Figure 2.4 gives an example comparing the critical discount rates
in the two scenarios for a given α.
17Lemma 2.2 gives that a non-disclosing antitrust authority requires a critical discount rate of
δ ≥ 1−φ2(1−α)−φ . While Lemma 2.4 shows that under a disclosing antitrust authority collusion can be
sustained if δ ≥ (1−α)(1−φ)2(1−α)−φ .
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Figure 2.4: Critical discount rates under regime of a non-disclosing and a disclosing
antitrust authority, for α = 1
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In case φ ≥ 1 (and still α ≤ 1
2
) collusion can be sustained for any δ ≥ 0, independent
of the information policy. These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3 Compared to a non-disclosing antitrust authority, a disclosing an-
titrust authority, which commits to F ≥ 0, {d} and {nl} in t = 0, increases the number
of colluding industries.
Proof The proof immediately follows from the discussion above. 
Before turning to the welfare analysis, it has to be analyzed whether firms will use
indeed the fine as a punishment if they have the choice between different instruments.
While under a non-disclosing policy the firms are indifferent between the two instru-
ments, in the case of a disclosing antitrust authority firms always prefer to blow the
whistle and price wars will no longer be observed. This yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2.4 In the case of a disclosing policy, firms will never use price wars to
sustain collusion.
Proof In the discussion above Proposition 2.2 it was shown that in the case of a non-
disclosing policy an increase in γ can be compensated by an increase in δeffnd such that
V + and the IC do not change. By comparing the respective firm values from collusion
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in the cases of a non-disclosing and a disclosing policy (equations (2.13) and (2.24)),
it follows that the same change in γ and δeffd would yield again no change in V
+,
since both equations are equal. Comparing the respective IC ′s, we know that for a
corresponding increase of γ and δeffnd that the IC in the case of a non-disclosing policy
(inequality (2.12)) does not change. However, the IC in the case of a disclosing policy
(inequality (2.25)) becomes slack, since the additional term in inequality (2.25), 1
1−αγδ,
is increasing in γ. Thus, due to maximizing V + firms choose γ as large as necessary
to keep the IC just binding and δeffd as large as possible (T
′ as low as possible), i.e.
dV +
dγ
= ∂V
+
∂δ
eff
d
dδ
eff
d
dγ
+ ∂V
+
∂γ
> 0. Moreover, if γ reaches its maximum (γ = 1), T ′ becomes
irrelevant. 
Since it is never optimal to choose T ′ > 0 and thus δeffd = δ, the optimization
problem becomes:
min γ ≡ arg max
γ∈(0,1]
V + (2.28)
s.t.
(γφ− 1) (1− (1− γ)δ) + γδ
1− α (2(1− α)− γφ) ≥ 0
(1− α)− αγφ ≥ 0
Now the consequences of a disclosing antitrust authority on the welfare can be analyzed.
There are three different effects.
First, as discussed above, both for α ≤ 1
2
and for α > 1
2
there will be more param-
eter values for which collusion is stable, if the antitrust authority commits to disclose
information.
Second, even if industries could collude anyway, there will be less price war periods.
As shown above, under a disclosing antitrust authority profit maximizing colluding
firms will never resort to price wars, while with a non-disclosing antitrust authority
price wars might either be necessary or firms are at least not worse off by using a price
war than by using the fine punishment. As price wars lead to marginal cost pricing
and thus to a welfare gain compared to monopoly prices, using fines reduces welfare.
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If paying fines is positive for welfare (e.g. due to welfare losses in raising taxes
which might be avoided by obtaining the fine), then there is a third welfare reducing
effect: With a disclosing antitrust authority, firms pay less fines on average. To see this,
assume that parameter values are such that firms are able to sustain collusion under a
regime of a non-disclosing antitrust authority without price wars.18 For such industries,
the number of price war periods is unaffected by the disclosing of information. However,
since T γ = T ′ = 0 and thus δeffnd = δ
eff
d = δ, comparing the IC
′s (inequality (2.12)
and (2.25)) implies that for a given φ the frequency of whistleblowing under a regime
of a disclosing antitrust authority is lower than the frequency of whistleblowing under
a regime of a non-disclosing antitrust authority.
These three effects are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5 Compared to a regime of a non-disclosing antitrust authority, intro-
ducing a disclosing antitrust authority is always welfare reducing.
Proof The proof follows immediately from the discussion above. 
2.5 Leniency policy
In this section the model is extended to analyze an antitrust authority which commits
to a leniency policy {l} in t = 0. In doing so, a firm that has blown the whistle
will get a reduced fine R = (1 − r)F with leniency parameter r > 0. In line with
the current antitrust policy of the European Commission and the US Department of
Justice, rewards for whistleblowing firms are assumed to be not allowed.19 Thus, the
leniency parameter is limited to r ≤ 1. Furthermore, the antitrust authority is assumed
to commit the fine reduction only for the first firm which blows the whistle.20 If both
firms blow the whistle simultaneously, one of them is randomly chosen as the first
whistleblower. For this analysis, where firms either do not blow the whistle at all or
18For example if φ > 1.
19An overview of the similarities and varieties of the leniency policy in the EU and in the US is
given in Section 3 of Spagnolo (2007).
20These two assumptions will be relaxed in section 2.5.3.
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do it simultaneously, a whistle blowing firm thus expects a fine of
E[F ] =
(
1− 1
2
r
)
F (2.29)
From r ∈ (0, 1] it is obvious that E[F ] < F .
Again, two cases has to be analyzed: The first, where a non-disclosing antitrust
authority commits to leniency {l} for whistleblowing firms. And second, the case of a
disclosing antitrust authority commits to {l}.
2.5.1 The non-disclosing antitrust authority
If the antitrust authority commits to F > 0, {nd}, and {l} with r > 0 in t = 0, the
expected fine/profit-ratio is E[φl] =
2E[F ]
ΠM
which is lower than φnl =
2F
ΠM
. From Lemma
2.2 it follows that sustainability of collusion requires for any given α ≤ 1
2
and φ < 1 a
discount rate of
δ ≥ 1− φ
2(1− α)− φ. (2.30)
Since ∂δ
∂φ
< 0, introducing a leniency programs with r > 0 always decreases sustain-
ability of collusion under a regime of a non-disclosing antitrust authority if E[φl] < 1.
This is shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Effect of leniency programs on sustainability of collusion under a regime
of a non-disclosing antitrust authority with E[φl] < 1
On the other hand, following Lemma 2.2, if φ ≥ 1, all industries with δ ≥ 0 and
α ≤ 1
2
are able to sustain collusion. For r ≤ 1, the fine/profit-ratio a firm expects when
blowing the whistle, E[φl], is equal or larger than
1
2
φnl. Consequently, the number of
colluding industries is not affected by leniency if φnl > 2. Under such an environment,
leniency only reduces the fine/profit-ratio firms expect to pay, ∂E[φl]
∂r
< 0, and thus
ceteris paribus21 increases the frequency of whistleblowing which is necessary to sustain
collusion, ∂γ
∂φ
< 0.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
21Holding δeffnd constant.
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Proposition 2.6 Introducing a leniency program under a regime of a non-disclosing
antitrust authority
(i) leads to less collusion if the expected fine is not too large (E[φl] < 1),
(ii) has no effect on the sustainability of collusion if the expected fine is large (E[φl] ≥
1),
(iii) increases the frequency of whistleblowing γ for holding the number of price war
periods constant.
Proof The proof follows immediately from the discussion above. 
2.5.2 The disclosing antitrust authority
A disclosing antitrust authority which commits to {l} with r > 0 in t = 0 has the
same effect on reduction of fines as discussed above, 1
2
φnl ≤ E[φl] < φnl. From Lemma
2.4 it follows, for a relatively low probability of demand shocks, α ≤ 1
2
, and as long as
the fine/profit-ratio without leniency was relatively low, φ < 1, sustainable collusion
requires a discount rate of
δ ≥ (1− α)(1− φ)
2(1− α)− φ . (2.31)
In such an environment it follows that ∂δ
∂φ
< 0. Thus, leniency leads to less collusion if
φ = E[φl] < 1. For a relatively high fine/profit-ratios, φ ≥ 1, the same results as for
a non-disclosing antitrust authority holds: If α ≤ 1
2
, all industries with δ ≥ 0 are able
to sustain collusion. Thus, the number of colluding industries which faces an α ≤ 1
2
is
not affected by leniency if E[φl] ≥ 1.
On the other hand, industries with a relatively high probability of demand shocks,
α > 1
2
, sustainable collusion requires a discount rate of
δ ≥


(1−α)(1−φ)
2(1−α)−φ if α <
1
1+2φ−φ2 and φ < 1
((3α−1)+(1−α)φ+2
√
2α2−α)φ
[2(3α−1)+(1−α)φ]φ+(1−α) if α ≥ 11+2φ−φ2 .
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One can show that for α > 1
2
, ∂δ
∂φ
> 0 always holds. So as a consequence, if the
probability of demand shock is relatively high, α > 1
2
, introducing a leniency program
leads to more collusion.
Figure 2.6 shows the trade-off a disclosing antitrust authority faces when introduc-
ing a leniency program starting from a relative low fine/profit-ratio.
(0,0) (1,0)
(1,1)(0,1)
δ
α
more collusion
less collusion
{nl}
{l}
Figure 2.6: Effect of a leniency program on sustainability of collusion under a regime
of a disclosing antitrust authority with φnl = 1, r = 1 and E[φl] =
1
2
From the discussion above it is known that the number of colluding industries facing
a relatively low probability of demand shocks, α ≤ 1
2
, is unaffected if the fine/profit-
ratio is high enough that E[φl] ≥ 1 holds. In contrast to that, the number of colluding
industries which face α > 1
2
, is always increased by a leniency program. Consequently,
introducing a leniency program with E[φl] ≥ 1 always increases the number of indus-
tries which are able to sustain collusion. An example for this result is given in Figure
2.7.
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Figure 2.7: Effect of a leniency program on sustainability of collusion under a regime
of a disclosing antitrust authority with φnl = 2, r = 1 and E[φl] = 1
A further effect of introducing a leniency program is that reducing fines increases
the expected firm value of collusive firms in equilibrium. From the previous section and
from the discussion above, it is known that the firm value from collusion is given by
V + = Π
M [(1−α)+2αγE[φl]]
2(1−δ) . It is easy to see that the expected fine/profit-ratio reduced by
a leniency program, requires an increase in the frequency of whistleblowing γ to hold
V + (and at the same time γE[φl]) constant. Following the same argument as used in
the proof of Proposition 2.4, the relevant IC (inequality (2.25)) becomes slack, since
1
1−αγδ is increasing in γ. Thus, firm are able to increase V
+ in equilibrium via reducing
γ.
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.7 Introducing a leniency program under a regime of a disclosing an-
titrust authority
(i) leads to less collusion in industries with a relative low probability of demand
shocks (α ≤ 1
2
), if the expected fine is not to large (E[φl] < 1),
(ii) has no effect in industries with a relative low probability of demand shocks (α ≤
1
2
), if the expected fine is large (E[φl] ≥ 1),
(iii) leads to more collusion in industries with a relative high probability of demand
shocks (α > 1
2
),
(iv) increases the frequency of whistleblowing,
(v) increases the firm value of collusive firms.
Proof The proof follows immediately from the discussion above. 
2.5.3 Extension: rewards for whistleblowers
Following the public discussion and the discussion in the literature around leniency
programs two extensions are considered: First, as e.g. argued in Aubert, Rey, and
Kovacic (2006) rewards (r > 1) for whistleblowers are introduced.22 Second, as
practised in the European leniency program and being discussed in Feess and Walzl
(2005) and Motchenkova and van der Laan (2005), leniency will not only be
granted to the first firm which blows the whistle, but, possibly with a lower reduction
in the fine, also for later firms.
In this framework, both changes have the same effect: they reduce the expected
fine even further. Consider first the reward. As E[F ] = (1− 1
2
r)F , allowing for larger
r reduces the fine.
Granting leniency not only to the first firm (with leniency parameter r1) but also
to the second firm (with leniency parameter r2) reduces the expected fine in case of
22It is assumed that r is restricted to be smaller than 2, since otherwise firms would have the incentive
to launching cartels over and over again with the aim to be jointly rewarded for whistleblowing.
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simultaneous whistleblowing to
E[F ] = (1− 1
2
r1 − 1
2
r2)F. (2.32)
Both changes have the effect of reducing the expected fine. In the extreme case (full
rewards for whistleblowing, r = 2) or full leniency for the second whistleblower (r1 =
r2 = 1) the expected fine is reduced to zero: E[F ] = 0. In any case, these changes
strengthen the effects of a leniency program as discussed in the previous subsections.
2.6 Conclusions
The developed model identifies the effects of different antitrust policies if firms are
not able to observe the market outcome directly. The main result is that information
spillovers from the antitrust authority to the collusive firms strongly matters. The
information spillovers enable firms to monitor each other and thus make collusion
more likely.
In general, the model shows that charging a fine for collusive behavior allows firms
in industries with a relative low probability of demand shocks to collude, even if the
industry-specific discount rate is so low that the threat of punishment through a price
war would be too weak to facilitate collusion. Thus, a non-disclosing antitrust authority
which charges fines from collusive firms enables more industries to collude.
An antitrust authority that discloses information about firms’ behavior further in-
creases the number of colluding industries. Then, the antitrust authority acts like
an independent monitoring instrument. This monitoring instrument makes the pun-
ishment through a price war periods unnecessary and unprofitable. If firms have the
choice between starting a price war or blowing the whistle and triggering the fine, they
will never choose price wars to sustain collusion. The reason is that whistleblowing
provides additional valuable information. This allows industries with a low probabil-
ity of demand shocks to collude more effectively, i.e. with a lower discount rate. In
addition, even industries with a high probability of demand shocks are able to sustain
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collusion. The fine can be interpreted both as a punishment tool and as the price for
the information about the behavior of the rival, i.e. as monitoring costs. Thus, the
effect of a modification of the total amount of the fine is ambiguous. On the one hand,
increasing the fine provides a harder punishment and thus increases the number of
colluding industries with a relative low probability of demand shocks. Furthermore, a
larger fine decreases the necessary frequency of whistleblowing of firms which had the
ability to collude even without an increase of the fine. On the other hand, an increase
of the fine is equivalent to an increase of the monitoring costs. These higher costs
reduce the sustainability of collusion in industries with a relative high probability of
demand shocks.
This implies in turn that a reduction of the fines - or the expected fine, as is the case
with a leniency program - has ambiguous consequences in general. If the probability
of demand shocks is relatively low and fines are not too high, a leniency program
reduces the number of colluding industries. However, if in contrast the fine is relatively
high, a leniency program only increases the necessary frequency of whistleblowing. On
the other hand, the number of industries which collude in an environment of a high
probability of demand shocks is always increasing if a leniency program is implemented.
These different polices have different consequences for welfare. This is not only
because the policies might decrease or increase the number of colluding industries,
but also because the use of whistelblowing as a colluding device instead of a price war
enables industries to reduce the number of periods where the competitive price prevails.
This lowers welfare even further.
These findings have implications for antitrust policy. The antitrust authority should
become aware of the adverse effects of the leniency program in combination with the
information provided to the firms during the prosecution of the cartels. The more gen-
erous leniency programs are, the lower are the expected costs for the useful information
firms get during an interaction with the antitrust authority. Leniency programs may in-
deed lead to more cartel cases via whistleblowing, i.e. increase the necessary frequency
of whistleblowing. Thus, more information exchange between these two adversaries can
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be expected. Since the information may just facilitate collusion in uncertain environ-
ments and leniency programs make information cheaper to get, the antitrust authority
should restrict the information flow to cartel members as much as possible.
Chapter 3
The deterrence effect of excluding
ringleaders from leniency programs
3.1 Introduction
In the context of cartels, ringleaders seem to play a crucial role. They often guarantee
the stability and the functioning of a cartel. They organize initial meetings, collect
data, and ensure a safe and repeated communication between the cartel members.
There are many examples of such ringleaders in the history of cartel cases.23
For example, the leader of the “Alloy cartel”, Usinor, did the calculations at the first
meeting and sent the conclusions of the meeting together with the definitive calculation
to the producers after the meeting.24 In the “Amino-acid (lysine) cartel”, the Archer
Daniels Midland Company (ADM) and Ajinomoto organized the secretariat of the
quantity-monitoring system.25 ADM – together with Hoffmann-La Roche – also was
at the helm of the “Citric-acid cartel” where it chaired the meetings and organized the
collection and distribution of data.26 In the cartel concerning gas-insulated switchgear,
23Ganslandt, Persson, and Vasconcelos (2008) suggest that during the period between 2002
and 2007 a ringleader was explicitly identified in approximately 23 percent of the European cartel
cases.
24Case IV/35.814 – Alloy surcharge (1998), paragraph 81.
25Case COMP/36.545/F3 – Amino acids (Lysin) (2000), paragraph 330.
26Case COMP/E-1/36 604 – Citric acid (2001), paragraph 273.
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Siemens and Alstom acted as (cartel) secretaries. As such, they arranged contacts
between the cartel members and had a crucial role in the organization of meetings
and in the compilation of information submitted by and passed on to the members.
Moreover, they managed the communication on behalf of the European undertakings
with the Japanese secretariat. They also convened and chaired meetings, took care of
the quotas, and managed the system of ‘E-mails Secure Transmission’.27
These examples illustrate that activities to run a cartel had to be organized by
at least one of the cartel members. The characteristics of these activities per se do
not require a special market position, size, or knowledge of the firm which acts as a
ringleader.28 Therefore, even if a reliable ringleader is crucial to run a successful and
stable cartel, it appears that any firm of an industry could be a possible ringleader
under such circumstances. In any case, this essay will focus on the consequences of
excluding the ringleader from leniency programs and not on the evolution of ringleaders.
Before thinking about the question how to treat ringleaders, it seems important to
point out that identifying initiators of cartels is actually possible. For instance, in the
cartel case of the Fe´de´ration Nationale Bovine in France, it became “[...] clear from
the documents [...] that the initiative for a price scale [...] came from the Fe´de´ration
Nationale Bovine (FNB). The FNB was especially emphatic in support of an oral agree-
ment, as statements (in the press) made by its vice-president show.”29 An antitrust
authority may also rely on evidence provided by cartel members, as was often the case
in the cartel cases described above, or it identifies the instigator of the cartel as the
27Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas insulated switchgear (2007), paragraphs 147, 173, 511–513.
28Ganslandt, Persson, and Vasconcelos (2008) argue that ringleaders tend to be large firms
since they have firm-specific indivisible cost associated with collusion, e.g. the cost of protecting
the cartel by buying out potential entrants. There are further characteristics which may determine
leadership and which are more firm-specific. For example, Hoffmann-La Roche and BASF as two
instigators of the vitamins cartel – due to a wide range of products – had a stronger position in relation
to their customers than other firms selling a single or limited number of products only. They also
had a greater flexibility to structure prices, promotions, as well as discounts, and had a much greater
potential for tying. Moreover, they enjoyed greater economies of scale and scope and an implicit (or
explicit) threat of a refusal to supply would have been much more credible (Case COMP/E-1/37.512
— Vitamins (2001), paragraphs 712–718). In the Nintendo case, Nintendo enjoyed a unique position as
the manufacturer of the products (Cases COMP/35.587, COMP/35.706, COMP/36.321 – Nintendo
(2002), paragraphs 406, 228–238). However, the model developed in this essay will not focus on the
evolution of ringleaders, though.
29Case COMP/C.38.279/F3 – Viandes bovines franc¸aises (2003), paragraph 175.
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leader.
The fact that ringleaders play an important role for collusive agreements raises the
question how antitrust authorities should deal with them. Having a closer look at the
legal approaches of the EU Competition Commission and of the US Department of
Justice reveals that ringleaders are indeed treated differently in both jurisdictions.30
The leniency program established in the US law in 1978, stipulates that it is not pos-
sible for ringleaders to obtain a fine reduction through leniency. To be eligible for
leniency requires that “the corporation did not coerce another party to participate in
the illegal activity and clearly was not the leader in, or the originator of the activity”.31
When the EU set up its leniency program in 1996, this ringleader-discrimination rule
was adopted.32 However, due to the changes in the EU regulations in 2002 and 2006,
ringleaders now have the possibility to participate in the leniency program.33 Never-
theless, both antitrust regimes specify a fine load for ringleaders.34
Concerning the implications of these different approaches, it is often argued that
excluding ringleaders from leniency programs is detrimental as it hinders the detection
and the deterrence of cartel activities. As Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006) point
out, this was indeed the idea of the new EU leniency law which now gives ringleaders the
opportunity to benefit from leniency. In a similar vein, Spagnolo (2007) argues that
allowing ringleaders to apply for leniency may seed distrust among cartel members
which may finally deter cartelization.35 Also, Leslie (2006) argues that extending
30See e.g., Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006), Spagnolo (2007), and Feess and Walzl (2005)
for more detailed comparisons of the different approaches of the leniency program in the EU and in
the US.
31United States Department of Justice (1993), Corporate Leniency Policy, August 10, 1993, para-
graph A.6.
32European Commission (1996), Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in
cartel cases, OJ C 207, 18/07/1996, pp. 4–6, paragraph B (e).
33European Commission (2002), Commission Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines
in cartel cases, OJ C 45, 19/02/2002, pp. 3–5, paragraph A 11 (c) and European Commission
(2006), Commission Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ C 298,
08/12/2006, p. 17–22, paragraph II A (13).
34E.g., European Commission (2006), Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant
to Article 23 (2) (a) of Regulation No 1/2003, OJ C 210, pp. 2–5, and United States Sentencing
Commission (2008), Guidelines Manual, November 2008, paragraph 3 B 1.1. Fine loads for ringleaders
will be discussed in this essay in Section 3.5.
35On the other hand, the author also observes that “in an adversarial system [like the one in the
US], where testimony is crucial to persuade juries, testimony by a ringleader may not be convincing.”
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amnesty to ringleaders may increase deterrence since cartel members will than find it
harder to trust even trust the ringleader.
Apart from these few qualitative arguments, there is one experimental paper by
Bigoni, Fridolfsson, Le Coq, and Spagnolo (2008) who test the effect of ex-
cluding ringleaders from leniency. They show that if the ringleader is excluded from
the leniency program, the deterrence effect of leniency decreases. However, they point
out that this unambiguous result might be due to the experimental design. In the
experiment “subjects were matched pairwise into duopolies to avoid social preferences
effects towards non-defecting third parties. This, however, is the worst conceivable sit-
uation [..] of excluding ringleaders, as the ban leaves only one cartel member with the
option to self-report obtaining leniency, eliminating the incentives to ‘race to report’
generated by the risk that another cartel member could do it before. With more than
two firms, therefore, it is likely that the [ringleader] treatment will show more desirable
properties.”
There has been no rigorous formal study to theoretically analyze the effect of
ringleader exclusion on the sustainability of collusion. The developed model, aims
to fill this gap by setting up a model to allow for both scenarios in order to get a better
understanding of the effects described above. It is found that both regimes, i.e. the
ones with and without ringleader discrimination, may be superior. More specifically, it
is found that a regime where ringleaders are treated in the same way like other cartel
members (symmetric case) is always superior if the antitrust authority reviews indus-
tries with a relatively small probability only. In such a situation, giving ringleaders
an incentive to reveal information (to blow the whistle) leads to a higher probability
that the antitrust authority successfully prosecutes the cartel and thus decreases the
sustainability of collusion in general.
On the other hand, an antitrust authority which forgoes this additional information
– by giving ringleaders no incentives to reveal information (asymmetric case) – would
therefore run the risk of more cartel activity. However, if the antitrust authority reviews
the industries with a relatively high probability, the effect that more information leads
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to less collusion decreases in importance. Excluding the ringleader (asymmetric case)
may be the better option now. These ambiguity results from the three different effects
of excluding one potential whistleblowing firm.
First, as argued in the literature above, if the ringleader is excluded from the
leniency program, the probability that the antitrust authority is able to convict the
cartel decreases. Ceteris paribus the lower probability of being convicted leads to more
collusive activity of all firms.
Second, since the number of firms competing in the “race to report” is reduced when
ringleaders are excluded from this “race”, the expected fine of each (whistleblowing)
ordinary cartel member decreases. This is due to the fact that the probability that
one of them gets the full fine reduction increases if less firms are able to apply for a
fine reduction. The resulting lower expected fine results – ceteris paribus – in more
collusion.
Third, if the ringleader is excluded from leniency, it faces a higher expected fine than
an ordinary cartel member. As a consequence, firms would face asymmetric expected
profits from collusion if the ringleader and the members where to share the collusive
industry profit equally. At the margin, the cartel has an incentive to reallocate the
collusive profit to account for the difference. A ringleader requires a compensation for
the higher expected fines which increases its share of the collusive industry profit per
period. Such a reallocation of the collusive profit decreases ceteris paribus the sustain-
ability of collusion. This effect becomes stronger if the probability that industries are
reviewed increases. Generally speaking, a higher probability of being reviewed by the
antitrust authority decreases the expected profit from collusion through the reduction
of the expected number of collusive periods. If the expected number of collusive peri-
ods becomes smaller, the compensation scheme for the ringleader has to go up, which
increases the asymmetry of the industry and the sustainability of collusion decreases
even more.
Thus, if the probability that a industry is reviewed is sufficiently high, the asym-
metry – resulting from ringleader exclusion – may outweigh the two cartel-enhancing
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effects of excluding the ringleader argued before.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is developed. In
Sections 3.3 and 3.4, the cases without and with ringleader discrimination are analyzed.
Section 3.5 discusses briefly an extension of the model to allow for a higher fine for
ringleaders compared to the ordinary cartel members. The last section concludes.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Players
i. Firms
Consider an infinite number of industries where each industry consists of n ≥ 3 ex-ante
perfectly identical firms. The industry-specific market is made up of an infinitely large
number of submarkets.36 Firms compete in prices for an infinite number of periods t ∈
{0, 1, 2, ..,∞} and sell an industry-specific homogeneous product at constant marginal
costs c > 0 by placing selling bids on the submarkets. The monopoly industry profit
is given by Π.
If firms form a cartel, one of the firms has to act as a ringleader. An exogenously
given ringleader is considered, i.e. the evolutionary forces (or the strategic options)
which lead to a specific firm’s status as a ringleader will not be analyzed. Thus, it is
assumed that one of the ex ante identical firms is chosen randomly as the ringleader.
Furthermore, it is assumed that any collusive agreement produces evidence about the
organization of the cartel. Thus, when deciding on collusion, firms have to take into
account the enforcement policy of the antitrust authority.
36This assumption can be justified when considering a global economic environment with a large
number of regional submarkets. The aim of this assumption is to allow for allocations of even every
small market shares to firms.
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ii. Antitrust authority
The antitrust authority commits to an enforcement policy targeting collusive behavior.
The authority is assumed to be constrained in the number of investigations per period.
Thus, in any period the authority reviews a specific industry with probability ρ ≤ 1.
Once the review is under way and if firms have colluded in this period or in any period
before the review has started, the antitrust authority finds evidence to convict all firms
of the cartel with probability µˆ < 1. The fact that µˆ < 1 can be explained by pointing
out that usually antitrust authorities employ both economists who “look for smoke”
and lawyers who help convict firms. The first group would be in charge of the initial
review whose results are then used by the second group. As a consequence, even if the
first group finds evidence that a specific industry output is driven by cartel behavior,
the lawyers per se do not have no enough evidence to convict the cartel for collusion
any time.
In the case that the cartel is found guilty of collusion, the antitrust authority levies
a fine f . The fine is proportional to the collusive per-period profit of the convicted firm.
Indeed, a proportional fine seems to be more realistic than a lump-sum fine which is
often used in the literature. As such, firms which have benefited more from the cartel
have to pay larger fines which is true for antitrust case laws all over the world.37
Furthermore, the antitrust authority commits to a leniency program. The program
is captured by the fine reduction φ (with 0 < φ ≤ 1).38 It is assumed that only one firm
(the first whistleblower) is allowed to benefit from the leniency program.39 Moreover,
37E.g. in European antitrust law, the basic amount of the fine is calculated as a percentage of the
value of the sales linked to cartel activity. (European Commission (2006), Guidelines on the method
of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, OJ C 210, pp. 2–5,
paragraphs 13.–18.)
38Several authors (e.g., Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006)) argue that an optimally defined le-
niency program requires rewards for whistleblowing firms. However, no leniency program so far allows
such rewards for firms that reveal information. Thus, φ = 1 is the limit, which is equal to full immunity
from fines.
39The European and the US leniency program differ in that point. In the US, only the first whistle-
blowing firm is eligible for the leniency program. The EU does not use such a “the-winner-takes-it-all”
approach. Even the second and the third whistleblower may be eligible for leniency if they come up
with sufficient enough additional evidence to the authority. For a detailed discussion of these different
regimes see, Feess and Walzl (2005).
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the antitrust authority must decide whether or not a ringleader is eligible to apply for
leniency. Note that it is assumed that the identification of the ringleader is not subject
to controversy due to the evidence the antitrust authority has access to.
To account for the information revealed to the antitrust authority by the ringleader
– as an additional whistleblowing firm – it is assumed that each whistleblowing firm
leads to an increase in the probability µˆ that the cartel is indeed convicted in case of a
review by κ, i.e. µ = µˆ(1 + κnˆ), where nˆ represents the number of the whistleblowing
firms (with nˆ ∈ {0, 1, .., n − 1, n}). Note that even if one firm decides to blow the
whistle, the conviction probability must not necessarily be equal to one. This may
be justified by procedural problems or a time and budget constraint of the antitrust
authority.40
Furthermore, it is assumed that the authority is able to ensure that if firms (or a
specific industry) are convicted once, they will never have the chance to collude again.41
3.2.2 Timing of the game
The timing of the game is as follows: In period t = 0, the legal environment is defined:
The antitrust authority commits to a specific law-enforcement policy, i.e. it chooses ρ,
40These constraints are indeed relevant as pointed out by practitioners: “Seit 2002 sind in Bru¨ssel
so viele Selbstbeschuldigungen eingegangen, daß die Kartellbeamten sie la¨ngst nicht alle bearbeiten
ko¨nnen. Nur einem Bruchteil der Selbstbezichtigungsschreiben folgten weitere Schritte der Kommis-
sion, kritisiert der Bru¨sseler Kartellanwalt Ulrich Solte´sz. ‘Die Verfolgung erfolgt nach dem Zu-
fallsprinzip. Einige Fa¨lle bleiben jahrelang unbearbeitet liegen, wa¨hrend in manchem Sektor jeder
Verstoß gnadenlos und konsequent verfolgt wird’ [..] Claus Dieter Ehlermann, langja¨hriger Chef der
Generaldirektion Wettbewerb in der Kommission und heute als Anwalt ta¨tig, scha¨tzt, daß die Kom-
mission etwa zehn Kartellfa¨lle im Jahr entscheiden kann. Die Zahl der ja¨hrlichen Antra¨ge liege um
ein ‘Vielfaches’ daru¨ber.” (Since 2002 Brussels has received so many self-reportings that cartel of-
ficials have not been able to process all of them. The Commission initiated further steps only in a
fraction of the cases, criticizes the Brussels cartel lawyer Ulrich Solte´sz. ‘The prosecution is according
to a random choice. Some cases are not processed for years while in some industry sectors, every in-
fringement is prosecuted without mercy and with determination’. Claus Dieter Ehlermann, long-time
head of the Commission’s DG Comp and a lawyer today, estimates that the Commission can decide
on around ten cartel cases per year. The number of yearly self-reportings is several times above.),
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), December 5, 2006, no. 283, p. 22, ‘Mehr Rechtssicherheit fu¨r
Kronzeugen’.
41There is a discussion in the literature if a firm which has been convicted once will be able to
revert to collusion in the future. E.g. Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006) assume that collusion will
break down forever after a conviction, Motta and Polo (2003) assume that firms have to interrupt
the collusive activity for one period after the antitrust authority finds them guilty, and in Herre and
Wambach (2008) it is argued that firms are able to revert to collusion immediately after conviction.
CHAPTER 3. EXCLUDING RINGLEADERS FROM LENIENCY 47
µˆ, φ, and f as well as its ringleader policy. The subsequent periods t = 1, 2, ...,∞ all
have the same structure given by:
Stage 1 : Firms decide whether or not to collude as well as whether and how
to split the collusive industry profits between the ringleader and
the ordinary cartel members by allocating submarkets.
Stage 2 : Firms place bids on the submarkets.
Stage 3 : The antitrust authority reviews the industry with probability ρ.
Stage 4 : Firms decide whether or not to reveal information to the
antitrust authority (whistleblowing).
Stage 5 : The antitrust authority proceeds as committed to in period 0.
3.2.3 Firms’ strategies
Since this model is aimed at analyzing the effect of excluding the ringleader from the
leniency program, it concentrates on an equilibrium strategy where indeed all firms
would be willing to blow the whistle. The other cases where not all or even no firm
has an incentive to blow the whistle in equilibrium are discussed in detail below. First,
the following equilibrium strategy is analyzed:
AW (All firms blow the whistle) Firms collude from t = 1 on as long as no firm
deviates. If in period t the antitrust authority reviews the industry, all firms
which have the possibility to benefit from the leniency program blow the whistle
and reveal information to the antitrust authority. If the authority is not able
to convict the cartel, firms revert to collusion in period t + 1. If the authority
successfully convicts the cartel or if one firm has deviated, firms choose a price
equal to marginal costs, p = c, in every submarket in every subsequent period
(grim-trigger strategy, see Friedman (1971)).
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Before turning to the equilibrium analysis, the the following assumption – regarding
the value an additional whistleblowing firms means for the antitrust authority – is made:
Assumption 3.1 κ ≤ κ¯ = min
{
φf
n(n−1+(1−φ)f) ;
1−µˆ
nµˆ
}
.
This assumption ensures two important specifications of the model. The first term
ensures that the increase in the conviction probability µˆ through whistleblowing is
not too large so that the AW strategy as described above is an equilibrium. We will
comment on the derivation of this upper bound for κ in the next section. The second
term ensures that if all firms in an industry blow the whistle, the total probability of
conviction is not larger than one, i.e. µˆ(1 + nκ) ≤ 1.
3.3 Symmetric case: no ringleader discrimination
If the antitrust authority decides not to make a difference between a ringleader and an
ordinary cartel member when designing a leniency program – as it has been the policy
of the EU since 2002 – firms are symmetric ex post as well.
3.3.1 Joint whistleblowing as an equilibrium strategy
Consider a situation where collusion can be sustained in equilibrium and AW is an
equilibrium strategy: Thus, all n firms will blow the whistle if the antitrust authority
reviews the industry. Then, the collusive firm value of each firm amounts to
V +{n} =
Π
n
+ (1− ρ) δV +{n} + ρ
(
− µˆ(1 + κn)Πf
n
(
1− φ
n
+
n− 1
n
)
+
+ (1− µˆ(1 + κn)) δV +{n}
)
. (3.1)
Since the firms are identical, each of them gets the same share of the monopoly industry
profit, Π
n
, in every collusive period. With probability (1− ρ) the antitrust authority
does not review the industry and the firms continue to collude in the following period.
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This is represented by the second term of equation (3.1). The third term of equation
(3.1) reflects the case when the antitrust authority reviews the industry with probability
ρ. This term consists of two elements. First, the antitrust authority manages to
convict the cartel with probability µˆ(1 + κn). Remember that µˆ is the probability of
conviction which is increased by each of the n whistleblowing firms by the value of
κ. By assumption, only the first whistleblowing firm is allowed to benefit from the
leniency program. If n firms blow the whistle simultaneously, it is assumed that one of
them is chosen randomly as the first whistleblower. Therefore, a firm gets a reduction
of (1− φ) of the full fine Πf
n
with probability 1
n
. Consequently, with probability n−1
n
a
firm has to pay the full fine even if it has blown the whistle. If the antitrust authority
convicts the cartel, collusion breaks down. Second, with probability (1− µˆ(1 + κn))
the antitrust authority is not able to convict the cartel – even with the help of the
whistleblowing firms. In this case, firms continue to collude in the following period.
For expositional simplicity the total probability of conviction in the symmetric case
is defined as
µn ≡ µˆ(1 + κn) (3.2)
and the expected realization of the fine reduction as
ψn ≡ 1− φ
n
+
n− 1
n
=
n− φ
n
. (3.3)
Then, equation (3.1) can be rearranged to give
V +{n} =
Π
n
(
1− ρµnfψn
1− δ(1− ρµn)
)
. (3.4)
Next, the value of a firm that deviates from collusion is analyzed. The realization of
the deviating profit depends on the incentives of the firms to blow the whistle if one
firm has deviated. Note that if one firm has deviated, due to the collusive strategy
defined above, collusion breaks down and there is no returning to the collusive outcome
in any of the following periods.
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Lemma 3.1 Under Assumption 3.1 it is an equilibrium that all firms blow the whistle
if the industry is reviewed in case of deviation. Thus, the firm value of a deviating firm
amounts to
V D = Π− Π
n
(ρµnfψn). (3.5)
Proof We have to compare the individual expected realization of the fine. To this
end, we have to consider four different scenarios. First, if no firm blows the whistle,
firms expect a fine of
E[F ]{0} = −ρµˆfΠ
n
. (3.6)
If all firms blow the whistle, the expected fine is given by
E[F ]{n} = (1 + κn)
n− φ
n
E[F ]{0}. (3.7)
Next, if the other firms do not blow the whistle, a firm that does so faces an expected
fine of
E[F ]{1} = (1 + κ)(1− φ)E[F ]{0}. (3.8)
Last, a firm that does not blow the whistle – while the other firms do – expects a fine
of
E[F ]{n−1} = (1 + κ(n− 1))E[F ]{0}. (3.9)
Suppose that given one firm deviated, no other firm blows the whistle. Then, blowing
the whistle for a single firm would be optimal whenever E[F ]{1} ≤ E[F ]{0} ⇔ κ ≤ φ1−φ .
Comparing this value with φf
n(n−1+(1−φ)f) which is one of the two possible values of κ¯
from Assumption 3.1 reveals that E[F ]{1} ≤ E[F ]{0} holds for all n ≥ 1. Thus, consider
the case where all firms blow the whistle after deviation by one firm. Then, not blowing
the whistle must not be optimal for a single firm, i.e. E[F ]{n−1} ≥ E[F ]{n} ⇔ κ ≤
φ
n(1−φ) . Again, we have E[F ]{n−1} ≥ E[F ]{n} holds for any n ≥ 1 when compared with
κ ≤ φf
n(n−1+(1−φ)f) . As the other value for κ¯,
1−µˆ
nµˆ
, is either even lower or not relevant,
we can conclude that all firms blow the whistle if one firm has deviated and if the
antitrust authority has started to review the industry. 
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Equation (3.5) implies that a firm that deviates gets the whole monopoly industry
profit, Π, and expects a total fine of Π
n
(ρµnfψn) since all firms have an incentive to
blow the whistle.42
Collusion can be sustained if the firm value from collusion, V +{n}, is larger than the
firm value from deviation, V D. Thus, the critical discount factor above which collusion
can be sustained is given by:
δ¯{n} =
n− 1
(n− ρµnfψn)(1− ρµn) . (3.10)
3.3.2 Whistleblowers and silent firms
If firms collude and the industry-specific discount factor is lager than δ¯{n} and no firm
has deviated, not all firms (in every industry) have an incentive to blow the whistle if
a review is started. Thus, AW may no be equilibrium strategy in every industry, or
more precisely for every critically industry-specific discount factor, δ¯. The main reason
for this is that each whistleblowing firm increases the probability of conviction – and
thus for an end of collusive profits – by κ.
If the industry-specific discount factor converges to one and if firms face a relatively
small probability of being reviewed, not all firms (or even no firm) may have an incentive
to blow the whistle and thus stay silent if the review is under way. This is due to the
fact that the firm value from collusion, equation (3.4), goes to infinity if δ → 1 and
ρ → 0. Then, firms face a trade-off between reducing their own expected fine when
blowing the whistle and increasing the probability of getting collusive profits in the
next periods if they do not blow the whistle. At the same time, this includes a second
trade-off: When blowing the whistle, firms may reduce their expected individual fine
through the possibility of benefiting from the leniency program but they also increase
42Note that if one firm has deviated, this period is excluded from the collusive phase as collusion
breaks down by assumption. Thus, it is assumed that the single deviation profit, Π, is not considered
by the antitrust authority when evaluating the fine. This makes sense as the antitrust authority should
not punish the deviating firm more than the other cartel members in order to increase its incentives to
deviate. On the other hand, in order to leave the model as general as possible a per-se fine reduction
for the deviating firm is not assumed.
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the probability of being convicted – and thus of having to pay the fine – by the amount
of κ.
To account for this, two additional critical discount factors have to be calculated.
The first one, denoted by δ¯{n−1}, reflects a situation where it is not optimal for some
firms – or at least one of them – to blow the whistle. The second one, denoted by δ¯{0},
represents a value of the discount factor above which no firm has an incentive to blow
the whistle.
i. Some firms blow the whistle
To account for the cases where at least one firm has no incentive to blow the whistle,
consider the following equilibrium strategy:
SW (Some firms blow the whistle) Firms collude from t = 1 on as long as no
firm deviates. If in period t the antitrust authority reviews the industry, at least
one (but not all firms which have the possibility to benefit from the leniency
program) blows the whistle and reveals information to the antitrust authority. If
the authority is not able to convict the cartel, firms revert to collusion in period
t+1. If the authority successfully convicts the cartel or if one firm has deviated,
firms set prices equal to marginal costs in every submarket in every subsequent
period.
As described above, to identify the parameter space where SW is an equilibrium
strategy, the border above which at least one firm has no incentive to blow the whistle
has to be calculated. To calculate this border the one-stage deviation principle is used.
Due to this, it is sufficient to prove that the collusive firm value of a firm – unlike
the other firms – which does not blow the whistle once (when the collusive industry is
reviewed) is larger when being silent once, {s1}. Such a silent firm has the following
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collusive firm value:
V +{n,s1} =
Π
n
+ (1− ρ) δV +{n} + ρ
(
− µˆ(1 + κ(n− 1))Πf
n
+
+ (1− µˆ(1 + κ(n− 1))) δV +{n}
)
. (3.11)
A silent firm faces a smaller probability of conviction, µˆ(1+κ(n−1)), compared to the
probability under the AW strategy in equation (3.1), µˆ(1+κn). At the same time, this
means that the probability of getting collusive profits in the future, (1− µˆ(1 + κ(n− 1))),
is increased. On the other hand, it forgoes the possibility of getting a reduced fine
through leniency and has to pay the full fine, Πf
n
, when convicted. This strategy is
profitable if V +{n,s1} ≥ V +{n} which holds if
δ ≥ ((1 + κn)φ− κn)f
((1 + κn)(1− ρµˆ(1 + (n− 1)κ))φ− κn)f + κn ≡ δ¯{n−1}. (3.12)
Given this expression Assumption 3.1 can be justified. As matter of fact, comparing
δ¯{n−1} and δ¯{n} reveals that δ¯{n} ≤ δ¯{n−1} for all ρˆ ≤ ((1+κn)φ−κn)f−κn(n−1)((1+κn)φ−κn)f(1+κn)µˆ . Note that
ρˆ = 0 for κ = φf
n(n−1+(1−φ)f) . This means that only for a κ lower than this value, there
exists a region where all colluding firms have an incentive to blow the whistle and thus
AW always is the collusive strategy.
ii. No firm blows the whistle
If no firm has an incentive to blow the whistle in equilibrium, the equilibrium strategy
has to be defined as follows:
NW (No firm blows the whistle) Firms collude from t = 1 on as long as no firm
deviates. If in period t, the antitrust authority reviews the industry, no firm
blows the whistle. If the authority is not able to convict the cartel, firms revert
to collusion in period t+ 1. If the authority successfully convicts the cartel or if
one firm has deviated, firms set a price equal to marginal costs in every submarket
in every subsequent period.
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If NW is the equilibrium strategy, the collusive firm value of each firm amounts to
V +{0} =
Π
n
+ (1− ρ) δV +{0} + ρ
(
−µˆΠf
n
+ (1− µˆ) δV +{0}
)
. (3.13)
Thus, all firms have to pay the full fine, they do not increase the probability of being
convicted, and they do not decrease the probability of getting collusive profits in the
future. Again, due to the one-stage deviation principle, a single firm which – unlike
the other firms – blows the whistle once, {b1}, has the following collusive firm value:
V +{0,b1} =
Π
n
+ (1− ρ) δV +{0} + ρ
(
− µˆ(1 + κ)Πf(1− φ)
n
+
+ (1− µˆ(1 + κ)) δV +{0}
)
. (3.14)
The single whistleblower increases the probability of being convicted by κ. However,
this firm can be sure to benefit from the leniency program in the case of conviction.
On the other hand, whistleblowing reduces the probability of getting future profits
from collusion from (1− µˆ) to (1− µˆ(1 + κ)). A firm would choose this strategy if
V +{0,b1} ≥ V +{0}. To calculate the corresponding critical discount factor, equation (3.13)
can be rearranged to
V +{0} =
Π
n
(
1− ρµˆf
1− δ(1− ρµˆ)
)
. (3.15)
Thus, the critical discount factor above which no firm blows the whistle is given by:
δ =
((1 + κ)φ− κ)f
((1 + κ)(1− ρµˆ)φ− κ)f + κ ≡ δ¯{0}. (3.16)
Note that the existence of the SW and NW strategies is not discussed in detail since
they are not the focus of this model. However, the existence and the size of these
regions depend on the value of κ. If the additional value by which a firm increases
the probability of being convicted goes to zero, firms no longer face the trade-offs as
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described above, i.e. equations (3.12) and (3.16) show that if κ→ 0 and if the antitrust
authority reviews the industry, it is always an equilibrium strategy that all firms blow
the whistle.
3.3.3 Numerical example
Now a numerical example is considered to illustrate the findings so far. To this end,
let n = 3, µˆ = 1
2
, f = 10, φ = 1, and κ = 1
10
. Note that f = 10 implies that
firms have to pay a fine ten times their collusive per-period profit. This seems to be an
adequate assumption since if ρ is smaller than one, firms enjoy collusive profits for some
periods before being convicted. The fine then accounts for the profits made during these
periods.43 Furthermore, φ = 1 implies that the case where the first whistleblowing firm
gets full leniency is investigated. The resulting characteristics of the critical discount
factors are shown in the following figure:
43Moreover, e.g., the Guidelines of the EU require the basic amount of the fine to be multiplied
by the number of years of infringement (European Commission (2006), Guidelines on the method
of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, OJ C 210, pp. 2-5,
paragraph 19.).
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Figure 3.1: Critical discount factor without ringleader discrimination
The critical discount factor is given by the thick solid line in Figure 3.1. For any
discount rates below the dashed line, AW is an equilibrium strategy. If the industry-
specific discount factor lies in between the dashed line and the thin solid line, SW is
an equilibrium. Whenever the discount factor is larger than the one represented by
the thin solid line, firms opt for the NW strategy and no firm will blow the whistle in
equilibrium.
Now the asymmetric case where the ringleader cannot apply for leniency is investi-
gated.
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3.4 Asymmetric case: ringleader discrimination
As mentioned in the introduction, the US Department of Justice (just like the former
EU leniency program) excludes ringleaders from the leniency program. Intuitively,
from the discussion of the symmetric case, one would expect that a smaller number of
firms that are eligible for leniency would have the effect of reducing the expected fine for
the whistleblowing firms and that the probability of conviction decreases by κ. These
two effects should increase the sustainability of collusion and thus decrease the critical
discount factor for these firms. This reasoning, however, falls short of one important
aspect: The excluded ringleader faces a higher expected fine. Ceteris paribus, if firms
share the collusive industry profit equally as in the symmetric case, the sustainability
of collusion is reduced and the critical discount factor of the ringleader rises due to
the higher expected fine. Using the identical parameters values from the numerical
example in section 3.3.3, these two opposing effects are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
ρ
δ¯
δ¯{n}
δˆRL
δˆM
0.05 0.1 0.15
0.7
0.8
0.9
0
1
Figure 3.2: Critical discount factors with ringleader discrimination and symmetric profit
sharing
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The solid line represents the critical discount factor for the symmetric case. The
upper dotted line gives the unadjusted critical discount factor for the ringleader. As
such, it must lie above the one for the symmetric case as the expected fine for the
ringleader is larger. The lower dotted line shows that a symmetric sharing of the
industry profit would result in a lower critical discount factor for the ordinary cartel
members. At the margin, though, firms may now agree on a shifting of profits from the
members to the ringleader such that the ringleader’s critical discount factor may be
reduced – which comes at the cost of a higher critical discount factor for the ordinary
cartel members. It is a priori not clear whether the resulting profit-sharing rule will
actually lead to a higher or a lower critical discount factor than in the symmetric case.
More specifically, on the one hand, the adjusted critical discount factor may be
lower than in the symmetric case since the total probability of conviction will be lower.
Furthermore, the expected fine for a colluding ordinary cartel member decreases. The
ordinary members have a higher probability of benefiting from the leniency program,
since the number of firms which “race to report” is reduced. In addition they face
a lower fine, due to the effects of the proportional fine f in the context of the profit
shifting. These effects increase the sustainability of collusion.
On the other hand, the need to compensate the ringleader for the higher expected
fine decreases the collusive firm value of an ordinary cartel member. Furthermore, the
firm value of a deviating cartel member increases since – as already discussed – the
probability of being the firm which benefits from the leniency program increases. This
decreases the sustainability of collusion.
Given these considerations and the assumption that the leniency program is de-
signed in a way such that AW is the equilibrium strategy, the collusive firm values of
a ringleader, V +
RL,{n−1}, and a cartel member,V
+
M,{n−1}, can be written as
CHAPTER 3. EXCLUDING RINGLEADERS FROM LENIENCY 59
V +
RL,{n−1} = λΠ+ (1− ρ)δV +RL,{n−1} + ρ
(
− µˆ (1 + κ(n− 1))λΠf+
+ (1− µˆ (1 + κ(n− 1))) δV +
RL,{n−1}
)
(3.17)
and
V +
M,{n−1} =
(1− λ)Π
n− 1 + (1− ρ)δV
+
M,{n−1}+
+ ρ
(
− µˆ (1 + κ(n− 1)) (1− λ)Πf
n− 1
(
1− φ
n− 1 +
n− 2
n− 1
)
+
+ (1− µˆ (1 + κ(n− 1))) δV +
M,{n−1}
)
. (3.18)
As described above, the collusive firm values may be asymmetric now. The ringleader
gets a share λ of the collusive industry profit, Π, in every collusive period. Conse-
quently, since a ringleader never benefits from the leniency program, it always has to
pay the full fine, λΠf , in the case of conviction. The remaining profit, (1 − λ)Π, is
shared equally between the n−1 ordinary cartel members. Thus, every cartel member
gets a per-period profit of (1−λ)Π
n−1 and has to pay f times this value if the cartel is con-
victed. Since the ringleader has no incentive to blow the whistle, the total probability
of conviction is reduced from µˆ(1 + κn) to µˆ(1 + κ(n− 1)) compared to the symmetric
case. Furthermore, as the ringleader will never have an incentive to blow the whistle,
the members’ expected realization of the fine is reduced from 1−φ
n
+ n−1
n
to 1−φ
n−1 +
n−2
n−1 .
To take both effects into account the total probability of conviction is defined as
µn−1 ≡ µˆ(1 + κ(n− 1)) (3.19)
and the expected realization of the fine reduction as
ψn−1 ≡ 1− φ
n− 1 +
n− 2
n− 1 =
n− 1− φ
n− 1 . (3.20)
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Then, equations (3.17) and (3.18) can be rearranged to give
V +
RL,{n−1} = λΠ
(
1− ρµn−1f
1− δ(1− ρµn−1)
)
(3.21)
and
V +
M,{n−1} =
(1− λ)Π
n− 1
(
1− ρµn−1fψn−1
1− δ(1− ρµn−1)
)
. (3.22)
Now the analysis can be turned to the differences between the firm values of a deviating
ringleader and a deviating cartel member. As in the symmetric case, the result is
recorded in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2 Under Assumption 3.1 it is an equilibrium that all ordinary cartel mem-
bers blow the whistle if the industry is reviewed in case of deviation. Thus, the firm
values of a ringleader that deviates from the collusive agreement, V DRL, and of a cartel
member that deviates, V DM , amount to
V DRL = Π− λΠ(ρµn−1f) (3.23)
and
V DM = Π−
(1− λ)Π
n− 1 (ρµn−1fψn−1). (3.24)
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.1. We only have to compare a
cartel member’s individual expected realization of the fine. The ringleader will never
have an incentive to blow the whistle. Therefore, the ringleader’s firm value from
deviation is only influenced by the cartel members incentives to blow the whistle. To
this end, we have to consider four different scenarios. First, if no cartel member blows
the whistle, each member expects a fine of
E[F ]M,{0} = −ρµˆf (1− λ)Π
n− 1 . (3.25)
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If all n− 1 cartel members blow the whistle, the expected fine is given by
E[F ]M,{n−1} = (1 + κ(n− 1))n− 1− φ
n− 1 E[F ]M,{0}. (3.26)
Next, a cartel member that is the only one to blow the whistle faces an expected fine
of
E[F ]M,{1} = (1 + κ)(1− φ)E[F ]M,{0}. (3.27)
Last, a cartel member that is the only one not to blow the whistle expects a fine of
E[F ]M,{n−2} = (1 + κ(n− 2))E[F ]M,{0}. (3.28)
Suppose now that given one cartel member deviated, no other member blows the
whistle. Then, blowing the whistle for a single member would be optimal whenever
E[F ]M,{1} ≤ E[F ]M,{0} ⇔ κ ≤ φ1−φ . Comparing this value with φfn(n−1+(1−φ)f) which is
one of the two possible values of κ¯ reveals that E[F ]M,{1} ≤ E[F ]M,{0} holds for all
n ≥ 1. Thus, consider the case where all members blow the whistle after deviation by
one firm. Then, not blowing the whistle must not be optimal for a single member, i.e.
E[F ]M,{n−2} ≥ E[F ]M,{n−1} ⇔ κ ≤ φ(n−1)(1−φ) . Again, this means that E[F ]M,{n−2} ≥
E[F ]M,{n−1} holds for any n ≥ 12 +
√
1−4f(1−φ)
2
< 1 when compared with φf
n(n−1+(1−φ)f) .
As the second value for κ¯, 1−µˆ
nµˆ
, is either even lower or not relevant, we can conclude
that all members of the cartel blow the whistle if one firm has deviated and if a review
is under way. 
Equations (3.23) and (3.24) point to the fact that a ringleader or a cartel member
that deviates appropriates the whole industry profit, Π. However, they expect a differ-
ent total fine. A cartel member is able to apply for leniency and hence expects a fine
of (1−λ)Π
n−1 (ρµn−1fψn−1). Since a convicted ringleader always has to pay the full fine, it
expects a fine of λΠ(ρµn−1f).
Then, the critical discount factors for the ringleader as well as the members are
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given by
δ =
1− λ
(1− λρµn−1f)(1− ρµn−1) ≡ δ¯RL,{n−1} (3.29)
for the ringleader and
δ =
1− λ− (n− 1)
((1− λ)ρµn−1fψn−1 − (n− 1))(1− ρµn−1) ≡ δ¯M,{n−1}. (3.30)
for the ordinary cartel members.
As discussed above, intuitively the ordinary cartel members will be willing to forgo
some of their collusive profits at the margin in order to induce the ringleader to partic-
ipate in the collusive agreement. This is indeed always true if AW is the equilibrium
strategy, as can be seen from the proof of Proposition 3.1 below. To this end, the
equilibrium profit-sharing rule at the margin is such that δ¯RL,{n−1} = δ¯M,{n−1}. The
resulting profit share of the ringleader then equals
λ∗ =
1
2ρµn−1f(1− ψn−1)
(
2ρµn−1f(1− ψn−1) + (1− ρµn−1f)n−
−
√
(1− ρµn−1f)[(1− ρµn−1f)n2 + 4ρµn−1f(1− ψn−1)(n− 1)]
)
. (3.31)
Having a closer look at the ringleader’s profit share reveals the following:
Lemma 3.3 The ringleader’s profit share increases with the probability of being re-
viewed by the antitrust authority, i.e. ∂λ
∗
∂ρ
> 0, if the AW strategy is an equilibrium.
Proof The derivative is given by
∂λ∗
∂ρ
=
2ρµn−1f(1−ψn−1)(n−1)+(1−ρµn−1f)n
2−n
√
(1−ρµn−1f)[(1−ρµn−1f)n
2+4ρµn−1f(1−ψn−1)(n−1)]
2ρ2µn−1f(1−ψn−1)
√
(1−ρµn−1f)[(1−ρµn−1f)n
2+4ρµn−1f(1−ψn−1)(n−1)]
. From equa-
tion (3.31), one can show that λ∗ ≤ 1 if and only if ρ ≤ 1
µn−1f
. Furthermore, the denom-
inator of ∂λ
∗
∂ρ
is always non-negative for all ρ ≤ 1
µn−1f
. The numerator is equal to zero
if and only if ρ = 0 and is always negative if ρ ≥ 1
µn−1f
n2
n2−4(1−ψn−1)(n−1) =
1
µn−1f
n2
n2−4φ
which is always larger than 1
µn−1f
for any n > 2. Thus, ∂λ
∗
∂ρ
> 0 for all λ∗ ≤ 1. 
Making use of these results the following proposition can be stated.
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Proposition 3.1 If all firms blow the whistle in the case of an industry review and if
the ringleader is discriminated from leniency, ordinary cartel members shift profits to
the ringleader at the margin until their critical discount factors are the same.
Proof Consider ρ = 0. Then, (3.29) changes to δ¯RL,{n−1} ≥ 1 − λ and (3.30) to
δ¯M,{n−1} = −1−λ−(n−1)n−1 . Consequently, the profit-sharing scheme amounts to λ = 1n .
Together with Lemma 3.3, we get λ∗ > 1
n
if ρ > 0. If δ¯RL,{n−1} 6= δ¯M,{n−1} there
exists a set of industries i = (ρ, δ¯) where, at the margin, ringleader and ordinary cartel
members could adjust λ to coordinate on a critical discount factor between δ¯RL,{n−1}
and δ¯M,{n−1} if λ < λ∗ or on a critical discount factor between δ¯M,{n−1} and δ¯RL,{n−1}
if λ > λ∗. 
Lemma 3.3 and Proposition 3.1 point to the fact that the per-period profit of a
ringleader always exceeds its share in the non-discriminating case, i.e. λ∗ ≥ 1
n
. Fur-
thermore, the new share is increasing in the probability that the antitrust authority
reviews the industry.
These results indeed depend on the equilibrium AW strategy which will be obvious
from the discussion of the SW and NW strategies below.
3.4.1 Whistleblowers and silent firms
Again, it has to be taken into account that the value of an additional whistleblowing
firm, κ, significantly affects the equilibrium strategy. Since the ringleader will never
blow the whistle, only the incentives of the cartel members have to be considered. The
analysis is started with the SW strategy where at least one member does not have an
incentive to blow the whistle.
i. Some firms blow the whistle
Due to the one-stage deviation principle, a cartel member that is the only one not
to blow the whistle once (being silent once, {s1}) if the industry is reviewed has a
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collusive firm value of
V +
M,{n−1,s1} =
(1− λ)Π
n− 1 + (1− ρ) δV
+
M,{n−1}+
+ ρ
(
− µˆ(1 + κ(n− 2))(1− λ)Π
n− 1 + (1− µˆ(1 + κ(n− 2))) δV
+
M,{n−1}
)
. (3.32)
By doing so, this cartel member forgoes the possibility of benefiting from the leniency
program but does not increase (decrease) the probability that the cartel is convicted
(the probability of collusive profits in the next period). This strategy is profitable if
V +
M,{n−1,s1} ≥ V +M,{n−1} which holds if
δ ≥ ((1 + κ(n− 1))φ− κ(n− 1))f
((1 + κ(n− 1))(1− ρµˆ(1 + κ(n− 2)))φ− κ(n− 1))f + κ(n− 1) ≡ δ¯{n−2}.
(3.33)
Comparing (3.33) with the analogous critical discount factor in the symmetric case
given by equation (3.12), shows that both only differ in −κ, the additional value of the
probability of conviction which is missing here due to the exclusion of the ringleader.
This is intuitively straightforward since the number of firms which are able to blow the
whistle is reduced from n to n− 1.
Last, the boundary for the NW strategy where no firm blows the whistle has to be
checked.
ii. No firm blows the whistle
If no cartel member has an incentive to blow the whistle, the corresponding collusive
firm value of a cartel member amounts to
V +
M,{0} =
(1− λ˜)Π
n− 1 + (1− ρ) δV
+
M,{0} + ρ
(
− µˆ(1− λ˜)Π
n− 1 + (1− µˆ)V
+
M,{0}
)
. (3.34)
Note that the new profit share for the ringleader, λ˜∗, will differ from the equilibrium
profit share, λ∗, under the AW strategy. Moreover, λ˜∗ will be different from the sym-
metric profit share as well. As no ordinary cartel member blows the whistle under
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a NW strategy, the ringleader and the cartel members have the same collusive firm
value under collusion. On the other hand, due to the finding in Lemma 3.2 that cartel
members always blow the whistle if one firm has deviated and if a review is under way,
a ringleader has a lower firm value from deviation and thus a lower incentive to deviate.
As this results in a lower critical discount factor, the profit has to be shifted in the
other direction than under the AW strategy, i.e. from the ringleader to the ordinary
cartel members.
Then, the collusive firm value of a ringleader amounts to
V +
RL,{0} = λ˜Π + (1− ρ) δV +RL,{0} + ρ
(
− µˆλ˜Π + (1− µˆ)V +
RL,{0}
)
. (3.35)
To calculate λ˜, the new critical discount factors for the ringleader and for the cartel
members, δ¯RL,{0} and δ¯M,{0} have to be calculated. Equations (3.35) and (3.34) and as
well as Lemma 3.2 gives that
δ =
1− λ˜(1 + ρf(µn−1 − µˆ))
(1− λ˜ρµn−1f)(1− ρµˆ)
≡ δ¯RL,{0} (3.36)
and
δ =
(1− λ˜)(1 + ρf(µn−1ψn−1 − µˆ))− (n− 1)
((1− λ˜)ρµn−1fψn−1 − (n− 1))(1− ρµn−1)
≡ δ¯M,{0}. (3.37)
As δ¯RL,{0} = δ¯M,{0} has to hold at the margin, the new equilibrium profit share for the
ringleader is
λ˜∗ =
1
2ρµn−1f(1− ψn−1)
(
ρµn−1f(1− ψn−1) + n−
−
√
[ρµn−1f(1− ψn−1) + n]2 − 4ρµn−1f(1− ψn−1)
)
. (3.38)
Note that, from comparing equations (3.38) and (3.31) reveals that both profit-sharing
parameters are indeed different. Furthermore, one can show that λ˜∗ is always decreasing
in ρ as argued above.44 Now the analysis can be turned to the resulting critical discount
44Setting ∂λ˜
∗
∂ρ
equal to zero and solving it for any of the parameter values, does not give a solution.
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factor. An ordinary cartel member would deviate from the SW strategy if the associated
profit is higher than in the case where the firm is the only one to blow the whistle once,
{b1}, if the collusive industry is reviewed. Such a deviating member would have a
collusive firm value of
V +
M,{0,b1} =
(1− λ˜∗)Π
n− 1 + (1− ρ) δV
+
M,{1} + ρ
(
− µˆ(1 + κ)(1− λ˜
∗)Πf(1− φ)
n− 1 +
+ (1− µˆ(1 + κ)) δV +
M,{1}
)
. (3.39)
At least one cartel member would choose to deviate from NW if V +
M,{0,b1} ≥ V +M,{0}. To
calculate the corresponding critical discount factor, equation (3.34) can be rearranged
such that
V +
M,{0} =
(1− λ˜∗)Π
n− 1
(
1− ρµˆf
1− δ(1− ρµˆ)
)
. (3.40)
Thus, the critical discount factor above which no firm would blow the whistle if the
industry is reviewed is then given by
δ =
((1 + κ)φ− κ)f
((1 + κ)(1− ρµˆ)φ− κ)f + κ ≡ δ¯{0}. (3.41)
Interestingly, equation (3.41) is equal to the corresponding boundary of the symmetric
case given in equation (3.16). This means in turn that the the critical discount factor for
the NW strategy, is independent of the equilibrium profit-sharing rule, since λ˜∗ ≤ 1
n
.45
Note that all these calculations have to be done to prove that the AW strategy can
be an equilibrium. However, the results are important to specify the parameter values
of the analysis below. On the other hand, the existence of the parameter spaces where
SW and NW are equilibrium strategies is a second-order problem in the evaluation
if ringleader discrimination is superior or not. If in equilibrium not all firms have an
incentive to blow the whistle if the cartel is reviewed, then excluding one firm has no
Moreover, using the parameter values from section 3.3.3 give λ˜∗ =
6+6 ρ−
√
36+24 ρ+36 ρ2
12ρ . From this
numerical example it is easy to see that ∂λ˜
∗
∂ρ
< 0. Thus, ∂λ˜
∗
∂ρ
< 0 in any case.
45This results from limρ→0 λ˜
∗ = 1
n
and ∂λ˜
∗
∂ρ
< 0.
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effect. Of course, it affects the deviation profits since all firms would have an incentive
to blow the whistle if one firm has deviated and if the antitrust authority starts a
review.
Now it can be turned to the comparison of both scenarios.
3.4.2 Comparison with the non-discrimination case
Consider a situation where the antitrust authority has chosen an enforcement policy
such that AW maximizes the number of industries which are able to sustain collusion.
Note that this does by no means imply that the leniency program has a strictly adverse
effect; it just excludes those cases where for a relatively high value of κ, firms would be
able to collude for a larger ρ through the use of NW.46 Hence, the boundaries calculated
above, from which on firms switch from AW to SW and from SW to NW, only affect
the strategy by which collusion is sustained in equilibrium, but not the sustainability of
collusion in general. Under this condition only the slope of the critical discount factor
of the AW strategy determines the sustainability.
Concerning the AW strategy, however, the effects of discriminating ringleaders on
the sustainability of collusion may be ambiguous. Consider again the numerical exam-
ple from section 3.3.3. Plugging the parameter values into the equilibrium profit share
of a ringleader given by equation (3.31), results in
λ∗(ρ) =
3− 12ρ−
√
180ρ2 − 84ρ+ 9
6ρ
. (3.42)
Making use of λ∗(ρ), the critical discount factors for the asymmetric case, δ¯RL,{n−1} =
δ¯M,{n−1}, and the other relevant discount factors
(
δ¯{n}, δ¯{n−1}, δ¯{n−2}, and δ¯{0}
)
can be
calculated. They are drawn by Figure 3.3.
46Technically that means δ¯{0} < δ¯{n} R δ¯RL,{n−1} = δ¯M,{n−1}. We will no go into detail but
numerical simulations suggest that this condition does not hold if κ is so large (a single whistleblowing
firm is very valuable) that excluding the ringleader from the leniency program would unambiguously
increase the sustainability of collusion, i.e. δ¯{n} ≥ δ¯RL,{n−1} = δ¯M,{n−1}.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of both regimes (κ = 110)
Again, the solid line represents the critical discount factor for the regime where all
firms are able to benefit from the leniency program and where firms share the monopoly
industry profit equally. The dotted line represents the critical discount factor for the
asymmetric case, given the adjustment of the ringleader per-period profit to λ∗(ρ). As
can be seen from the figure both discount factors are the same for ρ = ρ˜ (with ρ˜ ∈ [0, 1])
and ρ˜ ≈ 0.13, in our example.
If the probability that the authority reviews the industry is small (ρ ≤ ρ˜) a regime
where the ringleader is discriminated results in a lower critical discount factor and thus
in more collusion. This is due to the lower total probability of conviction when the
antitrust authority excludes the ringleader. From Proposition 3.1 it is known that for
ρ → 0 firms shift a smaller share of the monopoly industry profit to the ringleader,
λ → 1
n
. So if ρ is small, the expected profit from deviation for excluded ringleaders
and ordinary cartel members is more or less equal to the symmetric case. At the same
time, the expected fine is increasing if firms are treated equally since this would result
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in a higher probability of conviction and less profitability of collusion. Consequently,
an antitrust authority which can only commit to review an industry with a relatively
small probability will be better off when allowing ringleaders to benefit from leniency
programs.
On the other hand, if ρ increases, it holds that λ → 1. If the probability that
the industry is reviewed becomes larger, the ringleader will obtain a larger part of
the collusive monopoly industry profit. This increases the asymmetry between the
ringleader and the cartel members by reducing the per-period profit of the ordinary
cartel members (and their expected fines) and thus increases their incentives to deviate
even if the discount rate is high. As can be seen in Figure 3.3, this effect on the
sustainability of collusion may dominate the sustainability-reducing effect of a larger
probability of conviction in the case where the ringleader may join the leniency program
(for ρ > ρ˜).
Note that for κ = 0, it is obvious that excluding the ringleader has to be always
superior. The antitrust authority would forgo nothing by excluding the ringleader
while the internal stability of the cartel decreases in ρ, since – as discussed in Lemma
3.3 and Proposition 3.1 – the profit of a ringleader has to rise since the probability of
been reviewed ρ is increasing, ∂λ
∗(ρ)
∂ρ
> 0.
The effect of a more asymmetric cartel does not necessarily outweigh the effect of
a larger probability of conviction. Figure 3.4 gives an example for the case where κ
is so large such that excluding the ringleader would always result in more collusive
industries.
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Figure 3.4: Ringleader exclusion fares always worse (c.p. κ increased from 110 to
2
5)
Compared to the situation before, as κ increases, the antitrust authority would forgo
very valuable information by excluding the ringleader. Such a large κ would increase
the probability of conviction to such an extent that non-discrimination is superior in
any case for the antitrust authority, since it results in less collusion.
The considerations above can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 If κ > 0 and if AW is the collusive strategy, there may exist a ρ˜
such that for any ρ > ρ˜ ringleader discrimination by the antitrust authority reduces
the sustainability of collusion. If ρ < ρ˜ non-discrimination is optimal for the antitrust
authority.
Proof Follows from a comparison of equations (3.10) and (3.29) (or (3.30)) given the
expression for λ in equation (3.31). 
The comparison of Figures 3.3 and 3.4 also reveals the assessment of both regimes
it quite involved. All of the relevant parameters, i.e. the value by which a whistleblower
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increases the probability that the antitrust authority finds enough evidence to convict
the cartel, κ, the scope of the leniency program, φ, the fine, f , the probability that the
antitrust authority finds enough evidence to convict the cartel without the help of a
single firm, µˆ, and the number of firms within the cartel, n, affect the sustainability of
collusion for a given probability of review, δ¯(ρ). At the same time, these parameters
also affect the differences between the two different legal environments – and thus the
position (or the existence) of a ρ˜.Since the effect of ρ on λ∗ is present only under
ringleader discrimination, the equilibrium share of the industry profit that a ringleader
gets, λ∗(ρ), affects the position of ρ˜ significantly.
Numerical simulations based on the example from section 3.3.3 give some insight
into how the different parameters affect the optimality of one regime or the other. The
tentative results are given in Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1: Comparative statics on δ¯, λ∗, and ρ˜
x f µˆ φ n κ
∂δ¯(ρ)
∂x
≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≤ 0 > 0 ≥ 0
∂λ∗(ρ)
∂x
≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ⋚ 0 ≥ 0
∂ρ˜
∂x
< 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 ⋚ 0
If ρ˜ decreases, the parameter space where a regime that discriminates ringleaders is
superior (for the antitrust authority) extends. Antitrust authorities should then again
favor excluding ringleaders instead of counting on the additional information ringlead-
ers have even if they have a relatively low probability of investigating the industry.
On the other hand, if ρ˜ increases, the parameter space where a regime that does not
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discriminates against ringleaders is superior becomes larger.
By making use of numerical simulations, the results of the comparative statics will
be characterized and described in the following section.
3.5 Numerical simulations
3.5.1 Impact of f
If the fine increases, collusion becomes less valuable and thus sustainability of collusion
decreases in general in both regimes, i.e. ∂δ¯(ρ)
∂f
> 0 for all ρ > 0. At the same time, for a
given probability of review, the ringleader will ask for a higher compensation than under
lower fines, i.e. ∂λ
∗(ρ)
∂f
≥ 0. This increases the asymmetry between the ringleader and
the ordinary cartel members and additionally decreases the sustainability of collusion,
since the ringleader ask for nearly the whole monopoly profit for a lower ρ now (see
Figure 3.5 ).
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Figure 3.5: Example for ∂λ
∗(ρ)
∂f
≥ 0 (f increases from 10 to 15)
Regarding the position of ρ˜, the argumentation above yields that both effects go in
the same direction. Consequently, ρ˜ has to decrease if fines increase (and vise versa),
i.e. ∂ρ˜
∂f
< 0. For an example, see Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Example for ∂ρ˜
∂f
< 0 (f increases from 10 to 15)
3.5.2 Impact of µˆ
The probability that the antitrust authority is able to convict the cartel without the
help of any firm, µˆ, is related to the probability that the industry is reviewed, ρ.
The total probability that a cartel is convicted depends on both probabilities. If the
antitrust authority becomes stronger in finding enough evidence, sustaining collusion
becomes harder – no matter if the ringleader is excluded or not, i.e. ∂δ¯(ρ)
∂µˆ
≥ 0. At
the same time, the ringleader has to get a larger part of the monopoly industry profit,
∂λ∗(ρ)
∂µˆ
≥ 0 and asymmetry increases in the same way the fine f increases asymmetry.
Again, both effects affect ρ˜ in the same way. Thus, an increase in µˆ results in a decrease
in ρ˜ (and vice versa), i.e. ∂ρ˜
∂µˆ
< 0. For an example, see Figure 3.7 below.
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Figure 3.7: Example for ∂ρ˜
∂µˆ
< 0 (µˆ increases from 12 to
2
3)
3.5.3 Impact of φ
If the leniency program becomes less generous (e.g. the fine reduction decreases from
φ = 1 (“full immunity”) to φ = 3
4
) the expected total fine of each cartel member (that
is eligible to apply for leniency) increase. As a result, the critical discount factors under
both regimes are larger for all ρ > 0 if φ decreases, i.e. ∂δ¯(ρ)
∂φ
≤ 0.47 However, this effect
on the critical discount factors differ in their strength under both regimes.
In contrast to all other parameters of the model, φ affects only the critical discount
47This is the standard adverse effect of the fine reduction in the context of leniency programs.
Leniency programs could ‘in principle [..] increase cartel activity’ (Spagnolo, 2004). That the
leniency policy can have the perverse effect of making collusion more stable is also shown by Spagnolo
(2000), Chen and Harrington (2007), as well as Herre and Wambach (2008). In the context of
fines, Becker (1968) is the first to argue, that infinite fines would always prevent individuals (or firms)
from illegal activities. These findings do not imply that starting a leniency program is fundamentally
wrong. It allows the antitrust authorities to collect information about cartel activity and thus gives
the authority the information it needs to detect cartels and may help to prevent firms from forming
cartels in the future.
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factor of cartel members which are eligible for leniency. Thus, if the ringleader is
excluded the critical discount factor of the ringleader is (initially) not affected by such
a change (see equations (3.29) and (3.30)). Different from that, under a regime where
the ringleader is eligible for leniency, all firms are affected by an change in φ.
Under a regime of ringleader exclusion, the firm value of the ringleaders is however
affected indirectly by the new profit sharing due to higher expected fines for the ordi-
nary cartel members. Since ceteris paribus only the expected profits of ordinary cartel
members decrease, the critical discount factor of the ringleader does not change. Only
the critical discount factor of the ordinary cartel members moves upwards. From the
discussion in Section 3.4 it is known that firms with the lower critical discount factor
always have an incentive to transfer shares of the collusive industry profit to firms with
a higher critical discount factor as long as the critical discount factors are not equal.
Consequently, the equilibrium profit share a ringleader gets decreases weakly at the
margin if φ decreases, i.e. ∂λ
∗(ρ)
∂φ
≥ 0.
However, since the critical discount factor of the ringleader is not directly affected
by a change in φ48, it is obvious that the profit sharing rule at the points where δ = 1
n
(ρ = 0) and δ → 1 has the be equal irrespective of φ. Thus, asymmetry between
ringleaders and ordinary cartel member decreases if the leniency program becomes less
generous, but the asymmetry decreases only very weakly since the change in λ∗(ρ) is
limited (see Figure 3.8 ).
48Since λ∗(ρ) has to be adjusted when φ is changed, the critical discount factor of the ringleader is
only affected indirectly after this adjustment.
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Figure 3.8: Example for ∂λ
∗(ρ)
∂φ
≥ 0 (φ decreases from 1 to 34)
Knowing that the critical discount factor of the ringleader is not affected directly by
φ, it is clear that the effect of φ on the critical discount factor in a regime of ringleader
exclusion has to be very limited. The relatively weak change in φ on λ∗(ρ) is the reason,
why the effect of a decreasing sustainability of collusion if ringleaders are eligible for the
leniency program outweighs the effect of the weakly increasing asymmetry if ringleaders
are excluded. Thus ρ˜ increases if the leniency program becomes less generous (and vice
versa), i.e. ∂ρ˜
∂φ
< 0 (see Figure 3.9 ).
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Figure 3.9: Example for ∂ρ˜
∂φ
< 0 (φ decreases from 1 to 34)
3.5.4 Impact of n
A change in the size of the collusive industry changes the terms of sustainable collusion
significantly. In particular, adjusted profit sharing leads to significant changes in the
firm values from collusion and deviation. If the number of the colluding firms increases,
all firms have to forgo a part of the their former collusive profit share since the industry
profit is shared between more firms now. Thus, sustainability of collusion is reduced
under both regimes in general by a larger incentive to deviate, i.e. ∂δ¯(ρ)
∂n
> 0.
Note that even for ρ = 0 sustainability of collusion is reduced if n increases. Hence,
the ringleader should get a smaller part of the monopoly industry profit now. On the
other hand, as sustainability of collusion is reduced in general, the ringleader would
get a larger part of the monopoly industry profit in equilibrium if ρ is large: The
ringleader will ask for nearly the whole monopoly industry profit (λ∗(ρ) → 1) for a
lower ρ than in collusive industries with less firms, since the antitrust authority has
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access to more evidence now if all ordinary cartel members blow the whistle. Thus,
the effect of an increase in the number of colluding firms on the collusive profit sharing
between ringleaders and ordinary cartel members is ambiguous, i.e. ∂λ
∗(ρ)
∂n
⋚ 0, which
can bee seen in Figure 3.10 below.
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Figure 3.10: Example for ∂λ
∗(ρ)
∂n
⋚ 0 (n increases from 3 to 4)
Again, as already observed in the analysis of the impact of φ, the effect of the
number of collusive firms on λ∗ is relatively weak (in particular if ρ is high). This
can be seen from a comparison of Figure 3.5, 3.8, and 3.10. Moreover, if the number
of firms increases, the probability of conviction increases too. This effect is stronger
the more firms are eligible for leniency. Thus, the effect of reducing sustainability
due to more firms should be stronger in a regime where all firms are able to pass on
information to the antitrust authority. Numerical simulations suggest that this effect
on the position of ρ˜ is always stronger than the effect of reducing sustainability due to
the larger share of the industry profits firms shift to the ringleader if ρ is large. Thus,
ρ˜ increases in n, i.e. ∂ρ˜
∂n
> 0.
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Note that changes in the number of colluding firms have to be – in reality – always
integer. In the example, this has the effect that with one additional whistleblowing
firm a regime which allows the ringleader to blow the whistle becomes superior now
(see Figure 3.11 ).
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Figure 3.11: Example for ∂ρ˜
∂n
> 0 (n increases from 3 to 4)
3.5.5 Impact of κ
The effect of a change in the value by which an additional whistleblowing firm increases
the probability that the antitrust authority finds enough evidence to convict the car-
tel, κ, on ρ˜ is ambiguous. A larger κ makes it harder to sustain collusion since the
expected fine increases if more firms blow the whistle. As a result, the sustainability of
collusion has to decrease in general and the ringleader would ask for a larger share of
the monopoly industry profit since the effect on λ∗(ρ) and δ¯(ρ) is similar to the effect
of f and µˆ.49 Independent of this, Figure 3.12 illustrates that the affect of κ on ρ˜ is
49Thus ∂δ¯(ρ)
∂κ
> 0 and ∂λ
∗(ρ)
∂κ
> 0 if ρ > 0 has to hold again.
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ambiguous and thus differs from the affects of f and µˆ (see Table 3.1 ).
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Figure 3.12: Impact of κ on ρ˜ with three numerical examples
The thick solid line indicates a change of the optimality of both regimes subject
to κ. From the discussion above it is known that if κ = 0 the antitrust authority
is always better of with ringleader discrimination. If the antitrust authority has only
limited resources to investigate a specific industry (i.e. if ρ is small) then the parameter
space where a regime of no ringleader discrimination is superior widens as κ increases.
In this case, the evidence every firm can pass on to the authority can be viewed as
a substitute for the low probability of review. Now if ringleaders are not eligible for
leniency, then the antitrust authority forgoes a good opportunity to convict the cartel.
As a result, ρ˜ increases. However, from Figure 3.12 it can be seen that if a review
is very likely already (e.g., ρ = ρ˜2) and κ is large at same time (e.g., κ =
1
7
) then ρ˜
decreases if κ increases further. The antitrust authority would rather want to exclude
the ringleader from the leniency program in order to increase the asymmetry between
the firms. This is due to the effect which was already discussed above. If the value
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of the information of an additional firm is sufficiently high, the sustainability-reducing
effect of an additional whistlblowing firm is stronger than the effect of reducing the
sustainability through an asymmetric sharing of monopoly profits between ringleader
and ordinary cartel members (see e.g. Figure 3.4 and the example for n = 4 in Figure
3.11 ).
3.6 Extension: fine load for ringleaders
The discussions in the sections above have shown that the exclusion of ringleaders
may result in more collusion. Leslie (2006) discusses this effect (intuitively) and
suggests a way to deal with the stabilizing effect of ringleader exclusion: He notes that
“a proper way to signal antitrust law’s particular displeasure with cartel instigators
and ringleaders is to assign higher penalties to them, as the Sentencing Guidelines
currently do. This allows greater punishment for the offender who has done something
worse. [..] To the extent that making ringleaders eligible for amnesty may reduce
the expected cost of cartelization (and thus reduce deterrence), increasing ringleader
penalties compensates for this effect and maintains deterrence.”
In the model developed above one could think of doing so by introducing a fine load
of (1+ l)f (with l > 0) for the ringleader. In both cases put forward above, this would
mean that the sustainability of collusion would be reduced since the total fine for the
industry would increase in general. However, this would lead to a greater asymmetry
within the industry which would require an asymmetric profit-sharing rule in the non-
discriminating case as well. Such a rule would shift more profits to the ringleader. If
levying a fine load is possible in the non-discriminating case, it is also feasible in the
discriminating case. Then, however, there will be parameter regions where the result
affiliated above
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3.7 Conclusions
This chapter has focused on whether ringleaders of illegal cartels should be given the
chance to apply for leniency or not. The model identifies the different forces at work
which make one regime appear more favorable than the other. It was shown that both
approaches may be a useful means to curb cartel activity. Indeed, the model shows that
giving ringleaders the opportunity to participate in the leniency program is the better
option if the antitrust authority reviews industries with a relatively small probability.
In such a situation, the additional information provided by ringleaders leads to a higher
probability of conviction and thus decreases the sustainability of collusion in general.
However, if the antitrust authority commits to a relatively high probability of review,
the exclusion of the ringleader from the program may fare better. This is due to the
fact that the ringleader faces a higher expected fine, which calls for a compensation
by ordinary cartel members. The resulting asymmetry between the firms reduces the
sustainability of the cartel.
The analysis is based on specific assumptions concerning the functioning and the
homogeneity of the firms. The model assumes that firms are symmetric and that one of
these firms takes on the role of a ringleader. As a result, firms become asymmetric since
they are treated differently. However, as mentioned in the introduction, while certain
ringleader activities do not seem to require a specific type of firm, other firm-specific
factors (profit, revenue, size, etc.) may be crucial for firms to become ringleaders. It
would be interesting to analyze the characteristics which make cartel leadership more
likely and how they finally affect collusive stability. Clearly, introducing heterogeneous
firms into the model would imply that there is an a priori asymmetry in the market
which negatively affects the sustainability of collusion in general. Depending on the
ringleader’s characteristics, granting access to the benefits of the leniency programs
only to ordinary cartel members, will anyhow still have the effects discussed above.
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Chapter 4
Vertical integration and
(horizontal) side-payments –
asymmetric vertical integration in a
successive duopoly
4.1 Introduction
Industries differ with respect to the degrees of vertical integration and separation of
the firms on markets. The co-existence of vertically integrated and separated firms can
be found, e.g., in the U.S. petroleum-refining industry50, in the U.K. beer industry51,
in cable television networks in the U.S.52, in the Mexican footwear industry53, and in
the retail gasoline market in Vancouver54. One further example of co-existence can
be found in the upper tiers of the German natural gas market as well. This market is
interesting not only because of the existence of an asymmetric vertical market structure,
its story how it came into being is remarkable as well.
50See, e.g., Bindemann (1999) and Aydemir and Buehler (2002).
51See, e.g., Slade (1998a).
52See, e.g., Waterman and Weiss (1996) and Chipty (2001).
53See, e.g., Woodruff (2002).
54See, e.g., Slade (1998b).
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Before 30 January 2003, the first and the second tier of the German natural gas
market could be described as a separated successive oligopoly. On the first tier of
the market (upstream) there were five importing gas companies: Ruhrgas, VNG Ver-
bundnetz Gas, Wingas, Thyssengas, and BEB.55 On the second tier, about ten – so
called ‘regional gas transmission companies’ – sold natural gas to the downstream
customers.56 The market shares of the firms on the both tiers were, however, very
unequally distributed. There were two players on the market with significantly large
market shares. On the upstream tier, Ruhrgas had a dominant position. Ruhrgas
imported (and was producing) around 60 % for the natural gas on the German market.
On the downstream tier, a company called E.ON had an almost dominant position as
well. At the beginning of 2003, these two main players integrated to the only fully
integrated gas company in the German market: E.ON Ruhrgas. There were strong
resistances against this vertical merger from the competition authority, the monopoly
commission and some competitors. They feared a further increase of the already dom-
inant positions of the upstream supplier Ruhrgas and the downstream supplier E.ON.
On the other hand, the willingness to merge was strongly – and decisive – supported
by the German Ministry of Economics.57 However, some of the (smaller) market play-
ers went to court and launched a legal complaint to prevent the takeover. The court
decided that the merger should be delayed until a final decision of the court. Finally,
E.ON reached an out-of-court settlement with the complaining firms. To this end, all
firms withdrew from the complaint and the merger was permitted.
The main characteristics of the out-of-court settlements where horizontal ‘side-
payments’ to downstream competitors of E.ON. The ‘side-payments’ included asset
sales and asset swaps, one agreement on a common development of a power plant based
55In addition, there were six smaller producers of natural gas, which also supplied the lower tiers of
the market.
56Actually, they sold most of the natural gas to a third tier of the market, that consist of about
700 smaller distribution companies. These companies could be described as the final customers of
the two tiers above, even if there where some gas distribution of the first and the second tier that
sold directly to the final consumers. For a more detailed description of the complex structure of the
German natural gas market, see Lohmann (2006), Chapter 2.
57The main arguments both, in favor of and against the takeover can be found in Lohmann (2006),
Chapter 7, pp. 113.
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on natural gas, marketing contributions and even pure transfers of money. According
to E.ON, the costs of of these agreements amounted to around 90 million Euros.58
No details of the agreements were ever published. Thus, the real economic value of
the agreements is still ambiguous. The ‘side-payments’ were reviewed by the German
antitrust authority. The authority, however, “has not seen any harm of competition
law, regarding to these agreements”.59
Horizontal ‘side-payments’ seem to have played a critical role by establishing an
asymmetric vertical market structure, where some firms (or at least one firm) are (is)
vertically integrated, while other firms remain separated. Figure 4.1 shows the arising
market structure and the agreement of horizontal side-payments of the E.ON Ruhrgas
merger.
Ruhr
gas
other
upstream
firms
E.ON
other
downstream
firms
side-
payments
customers
Figure 4.1: Stylized structure of the German natural gas market at 30 January 2003
Ruhrgas and E.ON each ruled – due to their historically determined market shares
– around half of the tiers in the German natural gas market. Thus, for modeling
purposes one can assume that there are only one large player on every tier of the
58See. Lohmann (2006) and E.ON AG press release, 30 January 2003, ‘E.ON kann Ruhrgas-
U¨bernahme vollziehen’.
59See ‘Die Welt’, 3 May 2003, ‘Ruhrgas-U¨bernahme durch E.ON bescha¨ftigt erneut die Gerichte’.
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market60: Ruhrgas and the ‘other upstream competitors’ on the upstream tier, and
E.ON and its ‘other competitors’ on the downstream tier.
The model presented below focuses on the question how E.ON could make it sure
to be the only fully integrated firm through the use of horizontal side-payments. It
is shown how horizontal side-payments can be crucial to explain the development of
such a market structure where vertically integrated firms co-exist with fully separated
competitors. By assuming linear pricing in both tiers of the market, a simple model
of a successive Cournot duopoly is developed. In equilibrium one downstream firm
ends up in a position of being the only firm that is vertically integrated. The result is
driven by the fact that a downstream firm has an incentive to transfer side-payments
to the downstream competitor. This leads to an asymmetric vertical market structure
since side-payments prevent counter-mergers of the rivals. However, firms will pay side-
payments only to the downstream tier, while the upstream tier will never receive any
side-payments. Furthermore it is shown that antitrust authorities may allow for such
side-payments, since they increase the overall welfare compared to a market structure
where no firm is integrated. This results from the reduction of the welfare-decreasing
effects of double marginalization in the context of vertical market structures. However,
if firms would integrate anyway, the antitrust authority should ban side-payments since
they prevent a market structure where all firms are vertically integrated. A market
structure of full integration would increase welfare compared to a partially integrated
market that arises from side-payments. Thus a ban on side-payments would then
increase welfare.
Several papers in the literature analyze the co-existence of vertically integrated firms
and separated upstream and downstream firms in one specific market. The presented
model differs from these papers by explicitly investigating the effect of the possibility
to offer side-payments to the competitors.
Assuming linear pricing and Cournot competition in the upstream and the down-
stream market, e.g., Gaudet and Long (1996) and Abiru et. al. (1998) show
60Even if in reality, there is a much more complex market structure. See Lohmann (2006).
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that asymmetric equilibria may exist even if firms are perfectly symmetric ex-ante.
The co-existence of integrated and separated firms depends on the number of firms
on the upstream and downstream markets. If the number of firms on the different
tiers is the same, full integration is the only equilibrium with regards to these mod-
els. Elberfeld (2002) also obtains asymmetric integration equilibria in a symmetric
setting. Jansen (2003) analyzes the conditions where vertical separation is chosen
by some firms, while vertical integration is chosen by others in equilibrium. The deci-
sion whether integration is chosen in equilibrium depends on costs of writing exclusive
vertical contracts.61 However, for a successive duopolistic industry, there are no con-
tracting costs so that vertical separation and integration coexist in his model. A similar
argument to explain asymmetric vertical market structures in equilibrium is used by
Bu¨hler and Schmutzler (2005). They present a model of vertical backward inte-
gration in a reduced-form model of successive Cournot oligopolies with linear pricing.
They show that if downstream firms have to bear some acquisition costs to integrate
with an upstream firm, these costs might be the reason why in a successive duopolistic
industry only one pair of firms integrates. Their model is to the author’s knowledge the
first one to explain asymmetric vertical integration in a successive duopolistic industry
with quantity competition and linear pricing.
Most of the literature does not investigate the process of the vertical integration in
detail. It is usually assumed that firms are willing to integrate if it is unilateral prof-
itable for them. Furthermore, the resulting profits of the integrated firm are assumed
to be shared between the former independent units anyhow. In addition, a static game
of the integration decision is often modeled. This may result in a prisoners-dilemma, so
that firms integrate even if this is unprofitable in the end, e.g. due to counter-mergers
of the other firms.
By contrast, Ordover et. al. (1990) model the process of bidding for the up-
stream supplier explicitly. They analyze a symmetric vertical duopoly with Bertrand
61Jansen (2003) uses a variant of a model proposed by Gal-Or (1990), where the downstream
demand is linear, firms face Cournot competition, and upstream firms are able to provide non-linear
contracts (two-part tariffs).
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competition in the upstream market and differentiated downstream products. They
show that asymmetric vertically integration is an equilibrium if the revenues of the
downstream industry is increasing in the input price and the integration of one pair
of the firms raises the upstream price not excessively. Otherwise, the separated down-
stream firm has an incentive to integrate as well. They also show, however, that if
downstream firms face Cournot competition, the only equilibrium in their model is a
separated industry.
This chapter is organized at follows. In the next section, the model and the timing
of the integration game are introduced. In Sections 4.3 the equilibrium is derived. The
welfare analysis, policy implications and two extensions of the model are discussed in
Section 4.4. Section 4.5 discusses the assumptions of the model. The last section
concludes.
4.2 The model
4.2.1 Firms and the market structures
Consider a 2 × 2 successive model of ex-ante symmetric firms.62 In such an industry,
initially, there are two downstream firms Dk with k ∈ {1, 2} and two upstream firms,
Ui with i ∈ {A,B}, on a fully separated market. The upstream firms produce an
intermediate product which is bought by the downstream firms by an equilibrium
per-unit price of ω. Each unit of the intermediate product is transformed by the
downstream firms into one unit of the final product. For simplicity, it is assumed that
the marginal cost of producing the intermediate product is constant and normalized to
c. The marginal cost of transforming the intermediate product into the final product
is normalized to zero. On both tiers of the market, firms compete in quantities and
set linear prices. The demand of final consumers is linear and given by t(Q) = a− bQ,
where t is the price of the final product, Q is defined by Q = qD1 + qD2 , and a, b > 0.
62Most of the literature on vertical integration focuses on vertical duopolies and on symmetric
vertical market structures, e.g., Ordover et. al. (1990), Hart and Tirole (1990), Jansen
(2003), and Bu¨hler and Schmutzler (2005).
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The resulting outcomes of the different possible market structures are as follows:
After an integration, a firm produces the intermediate product in-house at costs of c,
whereas a vertically separated downstream firm buys the intermediate product from
the upstream market at the equilibrium price ω. Furthermore, integrated firms neither
supply the input to non-integrated downstream firms, nor purchase inputs from non-
integrated upstream firms.63 Thus, if both firms are separated (SP ), duopoly Cournot
competition is present in both tiers of the market. If both firms are integrated (full
integration, FI), the model corresponds to a standard Cournot competition duopoly
with marginal costs of c. If only one firm is separated (partial integration, PI) the
remaining upstream firm sets a linear monopoly price ωPI for the remaining separated
downstream firm. All these possible market structures are shown in Figure 4.2 below.
UA UB
D1 D2
ωSP
tSP
customers
UA UB
D1 D2
ωPIc
tPI
customers
UA UB
D1 D2
c c
tFI
customers
Figure 4.2: Possible vertical market structures in a successive Cournot duopoly
Just like Bu¨hler and Schmutzler (2005) – and following the example of the
E.ON Ruhrgas merger – the developed model focuses on backward vertical integration
only. Thus, it is assumed that only a downstream firm is able offer a payment to take
over the assets of one upstream firm.64 Even if only the downstream firms are able to
make offers, the integration cause some expenditures for the downstream firms65: The
63Salinger (1988) shows that, with final good Cournot competition, a vertically integrated firm
prefers not to supply to a second downstream firm. Whether integrated firms stay in the market
for intermediate products depends on the conjectures of integrated firms about the behavior of the
remaining upstream monopolist, see, e.g., Schrader and Martin (1998).
64This assumption will be discussed and justified in Section 4.5
65With respect to the costs of integration, Bu¨hler and Schmutzler (2005) assume that down-
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downstream firm has to pay an endogenous compensation payment p to the owner(s)
of the upstream assets, to take over these assets, since the profit from the market of an
integrated upstream unit is equal to zero. Thus, the owner(s) of the upstream assets
will ask for at least a price as high as their out-side option(s). The offer of such a
payment is assumed to be common knowledge, i.e. if Dk offers pki to integrate with
Ui, all other firms are able to observe this offer.
i. Market outcomes
Summing up, Table 1 gives all relevant payoffs of the firms Ui and Dk within the three
possible market structures discussed above, i.e SP , PI, and FI. All calculations can
be found in the Mathematical appendix, A.2.1. To keep the table well arranged, payoffs
are normalized by (a−c)
2
1296b
, thus, e.g., 96 in the SP case (separation) stands for 96 (a−c)
2
1296b
.
Furthermore, in the case of PI (partial integration), one example is shown where Dk
and Ui are integrated. To compensate the owner(s) of the upstream assets of Ui, Dk
has to pay pki to Ui. Moreover, in the FI case (full integration), Dl has to pay plj
when integrating with Uj .
66
Table 4.1: Market outcomes under different market structures
SP PI FI
Ui 96 pki pki
Uj 96 54 plj
Dk 64 225− pki 144− pki
Dl 64 36 144− plj
stream firms have to pay lump-sum acquisition costs, F > 0. These costs are the driving forces of
an asymmetric vertical market structure in their model. In the model analyzed here, such lump-sum
costs do not exist.
66Note that the pji’s do not have to be the same in equilibrium in the different market structures
of PI or FI.
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It can be seen that a downstream firm has an incentive to be the integrated firm in the
PI-market structure as long as 225− pki ≥ 64 ≥ 144 − pki ≥ 36. Furthermore, if for
example Dk and Ui have integrated, Dl has an incentive to propose a counter-merger
with Uj as long as 144 − plj ≥ 36 in equilibrium. To prevent such a counter-merger,
side-payments seem to be useful. For instance, Dk could offer Dl a side-payment that
would lead to a profit larger than the profit Dk could get after a counter-merger.
ii. Side-payments
It is assumed that firms can make side-payments among each other during the process
of integration. A side-payment is characterized by a transfer of (some) profits from
one (downstream) firm to the other firms on the same or a different tier of the market.
More specifically, hkl is defined as a horizontal side-payment of Dk to Dl, and hlk
as a horizontal side-payment in the other direction. A vertical side-payment from
a downstream firm to an upstream firm is defined by vki, if Dk transfers profits to a
upstream firm Ui. Side-payments are assumed to be common knowledge, i.e. if one firm
announces side-payments to another firm, all players in the market are able to observe
these offers. At last, firms are not restricted to offer (and to pay) side-payments to one
tier only: i.e. it is possible to pay both, h to rivals at the same tier and v to firms at
the other tier.
iii. Antitrust policy
To account for antitrust law, it is assumed that mergers are forbidden if one of the
following standard rules67 is violated: Firms can only integrate pairwise, i.e. only one
downstream firm is able to integrate with one upstream firm. Firms within the same
tier are not allowed to merge. Thus, ex-post monopolization of one horizontal tier
of the market is not allowed. Consequently, ex-post monopolization of the market as
a whole is forbidden as well. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4.5 where
side-payments in a market structure of ex-post monopolization are discussed in detail.
67To concentrate on the effects of vertical mergers only, all the literature presented and discussed
above make these assumptions on possible integration decisions.
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Policy implications due to side-payments are discussed later in Section 4.5 as well.
Initially, it is assumed that the antitrust authority is not able to forbid any kind of
side-payments as long as they do not lead to a violation of the standard rules mentioned
above.
4.2.2 Timing of the integration game
The integration game consists of seven stages and four (active) players which act se-
quential: One downstream firm Dk makes an initial integration offer – which may
include offering side-payments to other firms – to each Ui, with i ∈ {A,B}.68 More
precisely, each downstream firm is the first mover who can start to makes offers in Stage
1 with probability 1
2
. Later in the game, the downstream rival (the second mover),
Dl, can start making offers to the upstream firms as well, i.e. if the offers of Dk are
rejected by each upstream firm Ui or/and it is able to bid for a counter-merger with
the remaining upstream firm. Thus, the timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1 : One Dk offers contracts to take over the assets of an upstream
firm Ui. It offers a contract Cki = (pki, {vkj, hkl}) to Ui and a
contract Ckj = (pkj, {vki, hkl}) to Uj.
Stage 2 : Each Ui chooses between accepting {a} or rejecting {r} the
contract.
Since it is possible that both upstream firm reject or accept the offered contracts,
the following assumptions are made:
Assumption 4.1 If both upstream firms reject {r} the contract, Dk looses its first-
mover advantage to Dl and the games restarts in Stage 1.
68The model developed in this section will not focus on the evolution of such a first moving down-
stream firm.
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Assumption 4.2 If both upstream firms accept {a} the contract, Dk chooses Ui as
a partner if 171− pki − (hkl + vkj) ≥ 171− pkj − (hkl + vki) with i 6= j.69
Due to the assumptions, the game restarts in Stage 1 if both upstream units reject and
Dl starts to offer contracts. Otherwise the game continues in Stage 3 :
Stage 3 : Dk chooses (one) Ui as integration partner.
Stage 4 : Dk offers hkl to the seperated downstream firm Dl and vkj to
the seperated upstream firm Uj.
Stage 5 : Dl chooses between accepting hkl and staying separated; or
offering a takeover of the assets of the remaining upstream firm
Uj by offering plj .
Stage 6 : Uj chooses between accepting vkj and staying separated; or
selling its assets to Dl for a price of plj .
Stage 7 : All payments are reviewed by the antitrust authority and payoffs
are realized.
In the following section the equilibrium is derived.
4.3 Derivation of the equilibrium
The game is sequential, thus it has to be solved by backward induction, starting in
Stage 7.
69Assumption 4.2 ensures that the downstream firm sticks to the antitrust policy described above:
Integration is permitted pairwise only.
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Stage 7: payoffs
Suppose that partial integration can be sustained in equilibrium by the use of side-
payments. Hence, the game ends with a market structure where only one pair of firms
is vertically integrated, e.g. Dk and Ui. Due to antitrust considerations, there has to
be one separated firm on each tier of the market left, e.g. Dl and Uj . The downstream
unit of the integrated firm, Dk, owns all assets of the integrated firm, has to pay pki to
Ui, and may pay some side-payments, hkl and vkj, to the remaining separated firms to
prevent a counter-merger. Then the equilibrium market structure and the possibility
of side-payments results in the following payoff matrix:
Ui = pki (4.1a)
Uj = 54 + vkj (4.1b)
Dk = 225− pki − (hkl + vkj) (4.1c)
Dl = 36 + hkl (4.1d)
Stage 6: counter-merger acceptance
In Stage 6, the separated upstream firm, Uj , could either accept the vertical side-
payment vkj, and thus stand back from any possibility of integrating with the remaining
downstream firm, Dl. On the other hand, the asset owner(s) of Uj could accept the
merger offer, plj, from Dl.
It can bee seen, that the owner(s) of Uj accept to forgo the counter-merger, if (and
only if) the following (upstream) incentive compatibility constraint (IC U) holds:
54 + vkj ≥ plj. (IC U)
Constraint (IC U) ensures that Uj decides to stay separated on the market as an
upstream monopolist, if the price the downstream firm offers for its assets is lower
than the stand-alone profit of Uj as a remaining monopolist on the market for the
intermediate product plus the vertical side-payments it may receive from Dk.
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Stage 5: counter-merger offer
In Stage 5, the separated downstream firm, Dl, has the possibility to offer a price for
the assets of Uj , i.e. plj.
70 A counter-merger at price plj would create a fully integrated
market, where Dl receive a profit of 144− plj: the profit from the downstream market
under a fully integrated market structure minus the costs of taking over Uj’s assets.
Alternatively, it could accept the horizontal side-payment hkl, and thus commits
not to merge, i.e. not to offer plj . This results in a profit of 36 + hkl: the profit
from the downstream market under an asymmetric integrated market structure plus
the side-payments from Dk. Note that Stage 5 ends directly after the offering of plj or
after Dl accepted the side-payments, hkl. It is not possible to do both: receiving hkl
and offering plj > 0.
Again, it can be seen that Dj would accept the side-payment, if the following
(downstream) incentive compatibility constraint (IC D) holds:
36 + hkl ≥ 144− plj. (IC D)
Constraint (IC D) says that Dl would choose to accept the horizontal side-payment
and thus to forgo a counter-merger, if (and only if) the profit from the market as
a separated downstream firm plus the side-payment is larger than the profit as an
integrated firm, but by anticipating that plj has to be offered to (and to be excepted
by) to the owner(s) of the remaining upstream monopolist, Uj , in equilibrium.
Stage 4: side-payment offers
In Stage 4, Dk offers the side-payments to prevent a potential counter-merger.
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In order to maximize its profit in Stage 7, Dk has to choose a minimal sum of the
side-payments, vkj + hkl, which guarantees to be the only vertically integrated firm at
the end of the game. Thus, constraints (IC U) and/or (IC D) has to hold. The vertical
70It is defined that if Dl do not offer a payment to take over the assets of Uj, then plj is set to zero.
71If Dk does not offer any vertical or horizontal side-payments then vkj or hkl are assumed to be
equal to zero.
98
side-payment has to be chosen so that Uj accepts vkj and forgo any counter-merger
offer it expects in Stage 5. Or equivalently, the horizontal side-payment has to be such
high that it is not profitable for Dl to go for the counter-merger.
The condition for this to hold are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 To prevent a counter-merger, Dk offers a set of side-payments, {vkj, hkl},
which satisfies:
vkj + hkl ≥ 54. (4.2)
Proof From constraint (IC D) it is known that hkl ≥ 108 − plj. Constraint (IC U)
gives that Dl has to offer plj ≥ 54 + vkj to go for a counter-merger. Thus, hkl ≥
108− (54 + vkj)⇔ hkl + vkj ≥ 54. 
Lemma 4.1 says that if the sum of the side-payments, vkj + hkl, is larger or equal
54, the owner(s) of Uj can not expect to receive an (adequate) offer for its assets
(plj ≥ 54+vkj) in Stage 5. If condition (4.2) holds, Dl has no incentive to offer a counter-
merger contract in Stage 5 since the horizontal side-payments plus the profit from the
downstream market as a separated firm (hkl+36) is larger than the downstream profit
it gets from the market in a full integrated market minus the price it has to pay for
the assets of Uj , 144− (54 + vkj).
Stage 3: downstream firm chooses upstream unit
In Stage 3, Dk chooses one upstream firm as integration partner.
From Lemma 4.1 and from the payoff matrix in Stage 7 (4.1), it is known that Dk
will have a profit of ΠDk = 225− pki − 54 = 171− pki if it is the only integrated firm
on the market.
Dk is only able to choose a partner for the integration if at least one upstream
firm has chosen to accept, {a}, the contract in Stage 2. As described above, a contract
specifies the bid for the upstream assets and the set of side-payments. Thus, a contract
is given by CDkUi
(
pki, {vkj, hkl}
)
if offered from Dk to Ui, and C
Dk
Uj
(
pkj, {vki, hkl}
)
if
offered from Dk to Uj .
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If Ui accepts C
Dk
Ui
and Uj rejects C
Dk
Uj
, Dk signs an integration contract with the
owner(s) of Ui to take over the assets. Even if both upstream firms accept, due to
Assumption 4.2, Dk signs an integration contract with the owner(s) of Ui if pki+ vkj +
hkl ≤ pkj + vki + hkl.
Stage 2: upstream units decide to integrate or not
In Stage 2, both upstream firms, Ui and Uj , have to choose simultaneously to accept
or reject the contract offered to them.
From the discussions above it is clear that Ui will only accept the contract C
Dk
Ui
if
pki is at least as high as either its profit from the market for the intermediate products
when being the only separate upstream firm in a partially integrated market plus the
side-payment which will by offered in Stage 4, or the counter-merger offer it expects
from the remaining downstream firm in Stage 5. From Lemma 4.1 it is known that
the owner(s) of the upstream assets do not expect to receive an (adequate) offer for
its assets in Stage 5 if vkj + hkl ≥ 54. Hence, the separated upstream firm gets a
total profit of ΠUj = 54 + vkj in Stage 7. Thus, the owner(s) of the upstream firms,
e.g. of Ui, only accept a merger contract with Dk if the price for its assets is given by
pki ≥ 54 + vkj.
This result is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 The owner(s) of the assets of Ui accepts, {a}, a contract to sell the up-
stream assets to Dk if pki ≥ 54 + vkj. This holds if Dk offers a contract set of
CDkUi
(
pki ≥ 54 + vkj, {vkj, hkl}
)
, with vkj + hkl ≥ 54. (4.3)
Proof The proof immediately follows from the discussion above and form Lemma
4.1. 
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Stage 1: contracts are offered
In Stage 1, Dk offers the contracts to the upstream firms.
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Lemma 4.2 gives the contract that ensures a market structure where only Dk is
integrated. From contract set (4.3) it can be seen that any vertical side-payment
vkj > 0 increases the price Dk has to pay for the upstream assets. Thus, due to
profit maximization it is obvious that Dk offers contracts which include horizontal
side-payments only: Dk has to invest an amount of pki + vkj + hkl = (54 + vkj) + vkj +
(54− vkj) = 108 + vkj to reach the position of the only integrated firm on the market.
This investment reaches its minimum at vkj = 0.
As a result Dk offers contracts of
CDkUi
(
pki = 54, {vkj = 0, hkl = 54}
)
to Ui, (4.4)
and
CDkUj
(
pkj = 54, {vki = 0, hkl = 54}
)
to Uj . (4.5)
Equilibrium payoffs
Plugging in the results above in the payoff matrix in Stage 7 (4.1) gives the following
equilibrium payoffs of the integration game:
Ui = pki = 54 (4.6a)
Uj = 54 + vkj = 54 + 0 = 54 (4.6b)
Dk = 225− pki − (hkl + vkj) = 225− 54− (54 + 0) = 117 (4.6c)
Dl = 36 + hkl = 36 + 54 = 90 (4.6d)
From payoff matrix (4.6) it can be seen that both downstream firms increase their
profits due to the integration and both upstream firms are worse of compared to the
72Remember, if in Stage 2 no upstream firm has chosen to accept the contract, this action would
then belong to the other downstream firm, Dl.
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outcomes under a separated market structure (see, Table 4.1 ).73 Furthermore, the
payoff of Dl is larger than the payoff of the separated downstream firm which receives
the side-payments. Thus, there exists no hold-out problem of being the first downstream
mover in the integration game.74 Figure 4.3 below illustrates an example for a resulting
equilibrium market structure where D1 and UA are the integrated firms and D2 and
UB remain separated.
54 54
117 90
c
h = 54
customers
pUA = 54
Figure 4.3: Equilibrium market outcome and market structure from partial integration if
horizontal side-payments are payed
The following proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition 4.1 If ex-post monopolization of the market is permitted by antitrust
law and side-payments are allowed, then a partially integrated market structure in a
2×2 successive vertical Cournot market is an equilibrium. Due to profit maximization,
the equilibrium is sustained by horizontal side-payments only.
73That upstream firms are worse off and downstream firms increase their profits is due to the
assumption of backward integration. However, this result will be discussed in Section 4.5.
74Otherwise, e.g. if due to the side-payments Dl needs to ensure to prevent the counter-merger, the
profit of Dk would be higher than the profit of Dl, it could be an equilibrium that no firm would start
the integration game.
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Proof The proof follows immediately from the discussion above. 
4.4 Welfare analysis, policy implications, and ex-
tensions
This section gives some policy implication of the equilibrium derived above. The welfare
parameters of the market structures are compared and the antitrust policy with regard
to side-payments will be discussed. Furthermore, the assumptions that side-payments
are allowed in general and that ex-post monopolization of the market structure is
prohibited is relaxed.
Proposition 4.1 states that an asymmetric vertical integrated market structure is
possible if side-payments are allowed by antitrust law. In Table 4.2 it can be seen that
partial integration increases the total surplus (TS), the consumer surplus (CS), and
the equilibrium profit of the integrated downstream unit (ΠDk), while the producers
surplus (PS, which is equal to to profit of the whole industry) decreases compared to
the values under the initial fully separated market structure.75
Table 4.2: Comparison of a separated market structure (SP) and a market structure
of partial (asymmetric) integration (PI)
SP PI
ΠDk 64 < 117
PS 320 > 315
CS 128 < 220.5
TS 468 < 535.5
75All calculations can be found in Mathematical appendix, A.2.1 and A.2.2, (i) and (ii). Again, all
values are normalized by (a−c)
2
1296b , thus e.g. 117 as the equilibrium profit of the integrated downstream
unit, Dk, stands for 117
(a−c)2
1296b .
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4.4.1 The effect of a ban on side-payments
However, if side-payments were not allowed by antitrust law, it is easy to show that
in a model as developed above the equilibrium of the game would be full integration
(FI) where each downstream firm is integrated with on upstream unit:
With a ban on side-payments, Dk is neither able to offer Dl nor Uj a payment to
prevent them from a counter-merger. Thus, since the outside option of each upstream
firm which is not integrated under partial integration is equal to 54, one subgame
perfect equilibrium is that Dk and Dl make take-it-or-leave-it offers amounting to
pki = 54 and plj = 54 in Stage 1 and Stage 5 and upstream firms will accept these
offers. Thus, Table 4.1 and the Mathematical appendix, A.2.1 give the equilibrium
firm profits if side-payments are banned:
Ui = pki = 54 (4.7a)
Uj = plj = 54 (4.7b)
Dk = 144− pki = 90 (4.7c)
Dl = 144− plj = 90 (4.7d)
This equilibrium market structure (full integration) is the same as already described
e.g. in Bu¨hler and Schmutzler (2005) who analyze a 2×2 vertical Cournot market
structure under linear quantity contracts, but without considering side-payments. In
their paper, full integration is the only equilibrium market structure if the costs of
integration are low (or equal to zero).76
Under full integration, the effect of double marginalization does not exist any longer.
As a result, the consumer surplus and the total welfare increases under full integration
at the costs of an even lower industry profit as under partial integration. Table 4.3
gives the comparison in detail:77
76For other examples see, e.g., Gaudet and Long (1996), and Abiru et. al. (1998).
77All calculations can be found in Mathematical appendix, A.2.1 and A.2.2, (i), (ii) and, (iii) and
all values are normalized by (a−c)
2
1296b .
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Table 4.3: Comparison of a separated market structure (SP), a market structure of
partial (asymmetric) integration (PI), and a fully integrated market struc-
ture (FI)
SP PI FI
ΠDk 64 < 117 > 90
PS 320 > 315 > 288
CS 128 < 220.5 < 288
TS 468 < 535.5 < 576
Since the ban on side-payments results in full integration, the antitrust authorities
should be cautious by allowing side-payments among firms, even if they increase the
welfare and the consumer surplus compared to the initial separated market structure.
On the other hand, if no firm is willing to start the integration game, the authority
should allow side-payments.78 Independent of the question why no firm starts to inte-
grate, if no firm is willing to integrate, then allowing for side-payments would increase
the incentive to integrate since an integrated firm under partial integration (which
come about side-payments) has a larger profit, i.e. ΠDk = 117, from being integrated,
whether the rival starts a counter-merger, i.e. ΠDk = 90 (see the comparison of ΠDk in
Table 4.3 ). At the same time the welfare increases (see TS and CS in Table 4.3 ).
To take account of this argumentation the following conjecture is stated:
Conjecture 1 If an antitrust authority observes that no downstream firm starts to
78The circumstances why firms do not to start the integration game are not in the focus of this
model. However, it would be interesting to investigate the reasons for this. For instance, following
the model assumptions by Bu¨hler and Schmutzler (2005) the resulting downstream profit of
ΠDk = 90 could be too low to compensate the downstream firm for its ‘costs of integration’. One
further reason could be that the total profit of the integration parters under full integration, i.e.
ΠUi + ΠDk = 54 + 90 = 144, is lower then under separation (SP ), i.e. ΠUi + ΠDk = 96 + 64 = 160
(see, Table 4.1 and payoff matrix (4.7)). In the model developed above take-it-or-leave-it offers from
the downstream firms are assumed. Therefore, the model concentrates on the incentives to integrate
of the downstream firms only. Otherwise, if integration would require an increase in profits of both
production units, firms have no incentive to integrate if full integration is the market structure in the
end of the game.
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integrate in a 2 × 2 successive Cournot market, the authority should allow for side-
payments to increase the incentives of the firms to start the integration game.
4.4.2 The effect of lifting the ban on ex-post monopolization
So far ex-post monopolization of single tiers or of the whole market was assumed to
be forbidden in line with literature on vertical integration. It can be shown, how-
ever, that if ex-post monopolization is feasible, downstream firms are able to achieve
monopolization by the use of side-payments.
The argument for this is as follows: If ex-post monopolization is allowed by the
antitrust authority, Dk has an incentive to pay Dl a side-payment, hkl, to leave the
market. Then, Dl will not compete with Dk in both: the final product market and
during the integration game. If Dl leaves the market, a separated upstream unit can
not expect to get any counter-merger offer in Stage 5. Since the integrated firm would
not ask for intermediate products from the upstream market, a separated upstream
firm thus gets a profit of ΠUj = 0 when its rival integrates and one downstream firm
leaves the market. Thus, the owner(s) of each upstream firm accept to integrate with
Dk for price pki = plj ≥ 0.
Since the equilibrium price for the assets of one upstream firm is equal to zero, the
profit the downstream rival Dl can make by offering a counter-merger to Uj is given
by ΠDl = 144 + plj = 144 + 0 = 144. It turns out, to prevent a counter-merger Dk has
to offer a contract to each upstream firm Ui:
CDkUi
(
pki = 0, {vkj = 0, hkl = 144}
)
, (4.8)
in Stage 1 if ex-post monopolization is feasible.79
An integrated monopolistic downstream firm gets a profit from the final product
market of ΠDk = 324
80. With regard to the discussion above, Assumption 4.2, and
79From the discussion in Stage 1 it is obvious that Dk will not offer vertical side-payments to the
upstream units, since this would rise the price for the upstream assets.
80See Mathematical appendix, A.2.1 (iv) and note again that the value is normalized by (a−c)
2
1296b .
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profit maximization, Dk pays a price of pki = 0 to take over the assets of Ui and a
horizontal side-payment of hkl = 144. Allowing for such side-payments has the same
effect as a horizontal merger in the downstream tier. The equilibrium market structure
and the resulting payoffs for the firms are given in the following Figure 4.4.
0 0
180 144
c
h = 144
customers
pUi = 0
Figure 4.4: Equilibrium market outcome and market structure if ex-ante monopolization
is feasible
Both upstream units will have a profit of zero since they have no other outside
option. The two downstream firms share the monopoly profit. Thus, the integrated
firm gets a profit of ΠDk = 324−hkl = 324−144 = 180 and the separated downstream
firm a profit of ΠDl = hkl = 144 since it has to leave the market when accepting hkl.
The following table shows the values to compare the welfare results in a monopolistic
market structure (M) with the market structures already discussed above.81
81Again, all calculations can be found in Mathematical appendix, A.2.1 and A.2.2 (i) to (iv) and
all values are normalized by (a−c)
2
1296b .
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Table 4.4: Comparison of all market structures
SP M PI FI
ΠDk 64 < 180 > 117 > 90
PS 320 < 324 > 315 > 288
CS 128 < 162 < 220.5 < 288
TS 468 < 486 < 535.5 < 576
From Table 4.4 it can be seen that Dl has an incentive to monopolize the market
structure since it would increase its profit compared to the SP , PI, or FI cases. Sur-
prisingly, the antitrust authority would have no argument to forbid such side-payments
since even a monopolistic market structure increases the consumer surplus and the total
welfare compared to the initial separated market structure (SP ). Compared to a par-
tial integrated market (PI) the consumer surplus and the total welfare are lower under
monopolization, however. Conjecture 4.1 states that the antitrust authority should
allow for side-payments if downstream firms have no incentives to start the integration
game, however. The considerations in this section suggest that antitrust authorities
should restrict such welfare increasing side-payments to trigger partial integration only
since partial integration increases welfare by a larger amount as monopolization.
The reason is that integration reduces on the one hand double marginalization and
on the other hand it fosters competition between a vertically integrated firm and the
separated downstream competitor. As a result, this reduces the price in the final
product market. If the separated competitor do not compete any more, however, the
double marginalization is reduced, but competition is weakened as well. Interestingly, in
market structure as assumed above, the effect of double marginalization is so strong that
the welfare is affected positively compared to the market structure of full separation
where two firms on each tier compete.
The following conjecture takes account of the observations above:
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Conjecture 2 An antitrust authority that expects no downstream firm to start the
integration in a 2 × 2 successive Cournot market, should restrict side-payments to
partial integration only.
4.5 Discussion: backward integration
The developed model assumes backward integration only. Making assumptions about
the bargaining structure to explain certain equilibrium market outcomes is established
in the literature on vertical integration. The literature differs in the modality of the
assumptions, however. For instance, Hart and Tirole (1990) give all the bargaining
power to the upstream tier where firms with different marginal costs compete. In a
similar spirit Jansen (2003) allows for forward integration only and thus gives all
the bargaining power to the upstream firms as well, although there is competition of
perfect symmetric firms on both tiers of the market. Contrary to them – as already
mentioned above – Bu¨hler and Schmutzler (2005) assume backward integration.
Moreover, Fontenay and Gans (2005) assume a bargaining game about the rent
allocation between the integrated units.
However, the assumption of backward integration is not crucial for the result that
side-payments are important to sustain an asymmetric vertical integration in a succes-
sive 2× 2 market structure where firms face Cournot competition under linear pricing.
Changing this assumption into forward integration where upstream firms start to bid
for the assets of downstream units in Stage 1 and the following stages would be changed
in the same way, only the allocation of the rents between the tiers and the firms would
change: Under forward integration, the first moving upstream firm has the same in-
centives to pay side-payments to prevent a counter-merger of its rivals as well as the
first moving downstream firm under backward integration. Moreover, just like the
downstream firm before, the upstream firm will have no incentive to offer any vertical
side-payment since offering a side-payment to the separated downstream firm would
raise the price for the asset it needs.
Even assuming a bargaining game where the firms bargain the market structure and
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the distribution of the rents may result in an equilibrium of asymmetric integration
sustained by side-payments: From Table 4.1 it can be seen that an integrated firm in
a partially integrated market structure has a profit of ΠPII = 225. Starting with full
separation, an upstream firm will ask for at least its initial profit of ΠSPUi = 96. At the
same time, a downstream firm will ask for at least a profit of ΠSPDi = 64. From the
discussion above it is known that side-payments amounting to 54 have to be spend to
prevent a counter-merger. Thus, an additional profit from bargaining of ∆ = 225 −
96− 64− 54 = 11 > 0 has to be shared between the three firms which are necessary to
establish an equilibrium market structure of asymmetric vertical integration. It would
be interesting to analyze the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game. However,
two main problems may arise from bargaining: First, the increasing profit from partial
integration for the three insider firms comes at costs of one outsider. It is not clear
which firm will be this outsider. However, it would be neither clear if the outsider is
an upstream or a downstream firm. Second, the hold-out problem, as mentioned above,
may arise since it could be more profitable in equilibrium to be the firm that receives
the side-payment than to be the unit that is vertically integrated.
4.6 Conclusions
This essay shows how side-payments can be used to sustain asymmetric vertical inte-
gration in a successive duopoly market structure in an environment where firms sign
linear contracts and compete with quantities. As a result, under the assumption of
backward integration, a downstream firm prevents the counter-merger of its rivals by
transferring side-payments to them. An integrated downstream firm will, however,
never offer a vertical side-payment to the upstream tier since this would rise the price
for the asset it needs to take over.
The welfare analysis reveals that antitrust authorities should allow for side-payments,
since they increase the welfare compared to a market structure where all firms are sep-
arated. On the other hand, if firms are willing to integrate without side-payments,
such payments should be banned since they can be used to prevent a market structure
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of full integration. A fully integrated market results in a higher welfare compared to a
partially integrated market. Hence, a ban on side-payments would be welfare increas-
ing. Even if the antitrust law allows for side-payments, an antitrust authority should
restrict its use to pairwise integration only. The model shows that firms are able to
use side-payments to establish a monopoly. Surprisingly, even a monopoly increases
welfare compared to the initial market structure of a fully separated duopoly. Hence,
the effect of a strong reduction of the double marginalization outweighs the effect of no
competition in this model. Since partial integration leads to a higher welfare than the
ex-post monopolization, however, side-payments should be restricted to trigger partial
integration only.
Coming back to the initial example of the E.ON Ruhrgas merger on the German
natural gas market: Following the argumentation of the model developed above, one
can argue that it was a correct decision of the antitrust authority to allow for the
side-payments. Without the out-of-court settlements of E.ON with is competitors it
could be that no firm on the German natural gas market would be integrated by now.
The competitors of E.ON feared a reduction of its profits resulting from the merger.
This argument is in line with the model developed above. However, side-payments can
compensate the competitors for their losses. In the end, the downstream firm which
is integrated and the separated rival(s) which get the side-payments increase their
profits. Even the consumers profit from the vertical integration due to the reduction
of the double marginalization and the resulting lower price for the final product. All
these positive results come at the cost of lower profits of the firms on the upstream
tier of the market. The lower profits result from the assumed backward integration
structure of the model. This allocation of the rents disappears if the model is changed
to forward integration or extended to a bargaining game. However, it is again not clear
how the bargaining power should be distributed among the firms and how the timing
of the integration game should be assumed. Thus, the analysis of the bargaining game
is left for future research.
Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
This chapter provides a few concluding remarks on the topics presented in this thesis.
The model presented in Chapter 2 analyzes the effects of different antitrust policies
when firms are not able to observe market outcomes directly. Several interesting results
are derived. First, it is shown that charging a fine for collusive behavior allows firms in
industries with a relative low probability of demand shocks to collude, even if the threat
of punishment through a price war would be too weak to facilitate collusion. Thus,
charging fines from collusive firms enables more industries to collude. If information
about firms’ pricing history is disclosed, e.g. by the antitrust authority, the number of
colluding industries increases even further. Moreover, information makes punishment
via price war periods unnecessary and unprofitable. That is why firms never choose
price wars to sustain collusion now. Additionally, information increases collusion in
industries with a low probability of demand shocks and allows industries with a high
probability of demand shocks to collude. Since firms get information when blowing
the whistle, the fine can be interpreted both as a punishment tool and as the price for
information about the behavior of the rival. Thus, the effect of modifying the fine is
ambiguous. On the one hand, increasing the fine provides a harder punishment and
thus increases the number of colluding industries with a relative low probability of
demand shocks. On the other hand, an increase of the fine is equivalent to an increase
in the price of information, which reduces the sustainability of collusion in industries
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with a relative high probability of demand shocks. Therefore, leniency programs have
ambiguous effects in general. If the probability of demand shocks is relatively low and
fines are not too high, a leniency program reduces the number of colluding industries.
If the fine is relatively high, a leniency program only increases the necessary frequency
of whistleblowing. The number of industries which collude in an environment of a
high probability of demand shocks is, however, increasing if a leniency program is
implemented since it reduces the price of information for these firms.
The model has strong implications for antitrust policy especially with regard to
leniency programs. Antitrust authorities should keep the adverse effects of leniency
programs in combination with the information provided to the firms in mind. The
more generous a leniency program is, the lower the expected costs of information that
is useful for collusive agreements are. Moreover, leniency programs may lead to more
cartel cases since the frequency of whistleblowing increase due to lower fines. Thus
one might expect more information exchange between the authority and the firms.
As this may facilitate collusion – especially in uncertain environments – and leniency
programs render information less expensive, the antitrust authority should be extremely
restrictive with the information given to firms under investigation.
The model presented in Chapter 3 focuses on whether ringleaders of cartels should
be given the possibility to apply for leniency. This is (again) strongly relevant in
antitrust practice as the EU Competition Commission and the US Department of
Justice take a different stance on conduct vis-a`-vis ringleaders. The US law stipulates
that ringleaders can not obtain a fine reduction through leniency. Contrarily, due
to the reform of the EU leniency regulation in 2002 and 2006, ringleaders have the
option to participate in the leniency program in the EU. The model identifies several
parameters relevant for the question which regime is more favorable for an antitrust
authority. It is shown that both legal approaches can in different situations be useful to
reduce cartel activity. Giving ringleaders the opportunity to participate in the leniency
program is preferred by the antitrust authority if the probability that industries are
reviewed is relatively small. Then the additional information provided by ringleaders
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who undertake whistleblowing leads to a higher probability of conviction and thus
makes it consequently harder to sustain collusion. If the antitrust authority commits
to a relatively high probability of review, however, the exclusion of the ringleader from
the program may be the better option for the antitrust authority. This is due to the fact
that the ringleader faces a higher expected fine. The higher the fine for the ringleader
the higher the compensation the ringleader demands from the ordinary cartel members
in equilibrium. The resulting asymmetry between the firms reduces the sustainability
of collusion. The probability of review by that the one or the other approach is superior
depends on a number of parameters, e.g. the value by which a whistleblower increases
the probability that the antitrust authority finds enough evidence to convict the cartel,
the scope of the leniency program, the total amount of the fine, the probability that
the antitrust authority finds enough evidence to convict the cartel without the help of
a single firm, and the number of firms within the cartel.
As for policy implications, an antitrust authority should be aware that exclud-
ing the ringleader from leniency reduces the internal stability of a cartel since the
ringleader asks for a larger share of the cartel profit. If the authority is able to ensure
a high probability of review, an asymmetry in the industry could be more effective in
fighting cartels than to target on the additional information provided by a whistleblow-
ing ringleader. If the information from an additional whistleblower is very valuable,
however, allowing the ringleader to participate in the leniency program may be more
efficient in preventing cartel activity.
The model presented in Chapter 4 analyzes the effect of side-payments on the equi-
librium market structure in the context of vertical integration in a successive duopoly.
The model derive the result that firms are able to prevent counter-mergers of its ri-
vals by transferring a certain amount of its benefit from integration to one rival. This
transfer is defined as a side-payment among firms. Furthermore, assuming backward
integration it is shown that an integrated downstream firm will never offer vertical side-
payments to the upstream tier since this would reduce the profit of the downstream
firm due to the resulting rise of the price for the upstream assets.
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Again, some implications for the economic design of antitrust policies can be derived
from the model. The welfare analysis shows that side-payments should be allowed if
they trigger the welfare increasing vertical integration of at least one pair of firms. On
the other hand, if all firms on the market are willing (and able) to integrate pairwise,
side-payments should not be allowed since they can be used to prevent full integration.
Full integration would increase welfare compared to a partially integrated market even
more. Moreover, if antitrust authorities allow side-payments, they should restrict to
facilitate pairwise integration. The analysis shows that firms are able to establish
a monopoly by the use of side-payments. Even such a monopoly increases welfare
compared to a fully separated duopoly. However, partial integration leads to a higher
welfare than ex-post monopolization. Hence, side-payments should be forbidden if
firms try to establish a monopoly by the use of these side-payments.
Appendix A
Mathematical appendix
A.1 Chapter 2: Antitrust and imperfect monitor-
ing
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2.4
Proof We start with proving condition (ii): As ∂IC
∂δ
eff
d
= −(1− 2α) ≤ 0 for α ≤ 1
2
and
∂IC
∂δ
eff
d
> 0 if α > 1
2
, we will set δeffd = γδ if α ≤ 12 and δeffd = δ if α > 12 to calculate the
minimal δ(α, φ) where the IC holds. To prove condition (ii) we have to analyze five
cases depending on different parameter values of α and φ.
The simplest case is the proof for δ(α, φ = 0): If φ = 0, firms can always choose γ = 1,
thus the IC and the PC change to ICφ=0γ=1 = 2δ − 1 ≥ 0 and PCφ=0 = (1 − α) ≥ 0.
This leads to δ(α, φ = 0) ≥ 1
2
for all α ≤ 1.
The second case we have to prove is for δ
(
α ≤ 1
2
, φ < 1
)
: If α ≤ 1
2
, the PC always
holds if φ < 1 and thus γmax = 1. Furthermore the IC changes to ICδ
eff
d =γδ =
(1−2α)(δ−γδ)+(γφ− 1) (1− (1−γ)δ)+ γδ
1−α (2(1− α)− γφ) ≥ 0. From ∂IC
δ
eff
d
=γδ
∂γ
=
(1− δ)φ+2αδ− 2αδγφ
1−α and
∂2IC
δ
eff
d
=γδ
∂γ2
= −2αδφ
1−α , it follows that the IC has its maximum
at γ∗ = (1−α)[(1−δ)φ+2αδ]
2αδφ
. Since ∂IC
δ
eff
d
=γδ
∂δ
=
(
1 + αγ
1−α
)
(2(1 − α) − γφ) ≥ 0 if α ≤ 1
2
,
φ < 1, and γmax = 1, the minimal δ(α ≤ 1
2
, φ < 1) where IC ≥ 0 holds is determined
trough γ = min[1, γ∗]. Since ∂γ
∗
∂α
= − (1−δ)φ+2α2δ
2α2δφ
< 0, ∂γ
∗
∂δ
= − 1−α
2αδ2
< 0, and ∂γ
∗
∂φ
=
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−1−α
φ2
< 0, it is easy to show that for α ≤ 1
2
, δ → 1
2
, and φ→ 1⇒ γ∗ > 1. Thus we set
γ = 1 and ICδ
eff
d
=γδ changes to IC
δ
eff
d =γδ
γ=1 = (φ− 1) + δ1−α (2(1− α)− φ) ≥ 0 which
holds if δ(α ≤ 1
2
, φ < 1) ≥ (1−α)(1−φ)
2(1−α)−φ .
Accordingly we have to prove the cases δ
(
α > 1
2
, φ < 1
)
: If α > 1
2
, the PC only
holds if γ ≤ 1−α
αφ
≡ γmax and the IC changes to ICδeffd =δ = (γφ− 1) (1− (1− γ)δ) +
γδ
1−α (2(1− α)− γφ) ≥ 0. From ∂IC
δ
eff
d
=(1−γ)δ
∂γ
= (1−2α)δ+φ(1−δ)+ αδ(2−2α−γφ)
1−α − αδγφ1−α ,
we get γ∗ = 1−α
αφ
(1−δ)φ+δ
2δ
with γ∗ T γmax. Plugging γ∗ into ICδeffd =δ we get ICδ
eff
d
=δ
γ=γ∗ =
1
4αδφ
[((1 − α)(1 − δ)2)φ2 + (2δ(1 − δ)(1 − 3α))φ + (1 − α)δ2] ≥ 0. This condition
holds if δ ≥ ((3α−1)+(1−α)φ+2
√
2α2−α)φ
[2(3α−1)+(1−α)φ]φ+(1−α) ≡ δ1 and if δ ≤
((3α−1)+(1−α)φ−2
√
2α2−α)φ
[2(3α−1)+(1−α)φ]φ+(1−α) ≡ δ2.
Plugging δ1 into γ
∗ we get γ∗δ=δ1 =
1−α
αφ
(1+φ)α+(1−φ)√2α2−α
(3α−1)+(1−α)φ+2√2α2−α T 1, where
∂γ∗δ=δ1
∂α
< 0,
∂γ∗δ=δ1
∂φ
< 0, and as a result γ∗δ=δ1 ≤ γmax holds. It can be shown that γ∗ ≥ 1 if
α ≤ 1
1+2φ−φ2 . Thus, if α <
1
1+2φ−φ2 , we set γ = 1 and IC
δ
eff
d
=δ changes to IC
δ
eff
d
=δ
γ=1 =
(φ− 1) + δ
1−α (2(1− α)− φ) ≥ 0 which holds if δ(α < 11+2φ−φ2 , φ < 1) ≥ (1−α)(1−φ)2(1−α)−φ . If
α ≥ 1
1+2φ−φ2 , we set γ = γ
∗, ICδ
eff
d
=δ changes to IC
δ
eff
d
=δ
γ=γ∗ ≥ 0 which holds if δ(α ≥
1
1+2φ−φ2 , φ < 1) ≥ δ1. Plugging δ2 into γ∗ we get γ∗δ=δ2 = 1−ααφ (1+φ)α−(1−φ)
√
2α2−α
(3α−1)+(1−α)φ−2√2α2−α . We
can ignore this solutions, as with
∂γ∗δ=δ2
∂α
> 0 and
∂γ∗δ=δ2
∂φ
< 0 we get γ∗δ=δ2 > 1, when
going to the limits.
To prove the parameter cases for δ
(
α ≤ 1
2
, φ ≥ 1) is very simple again: If α ≤ 1
2
, it
follows that the PC always holds if γ ≤ 1−α
αφ
≡ γmax ≤ 1. Further, the IC always holds
if γ = 1
φ
≤ γmax. If we set γ = 1
φ
, ICδ
eff
d =γδ changes to IC
δ
eff
d
=γδ
γ= 1
φ
= (1−2α)
(
δ − δ
φ
)
+
(1−2α)δ
(1−α)φ ≥ 0 and the PC to PCγ= 1φ = 1 − 2α ≥ 0. Both conditions always hold if
δ(α ≤ 1
2
, φ ≥ 1) ≥ 0.
After all we have to prove the cases for δ
(
α > 1
2
, φ ≥ 1): Again, the PC holds if
γ ≤ 1−α
αφ
≡ γmax. Since φ > 1 it follows that γmax < 1 for all α > 1
2
. Furthermore
the IC changes again to ICδ
eff
d =δ ≥ 0. Consequently, the following proof is similar to
the proof of δ
(
α > 1
2
, φ < 1
)
above. Thus we get IC
δ
eff
d
=δ
γ=γ∗ ≥ 0 holds if δ ≥ δ1 and if
δ ≤ δ2. Plugging δ1 into γ∗ we get γ∗δ=δ1 = 1−ααφ (1+φ)α+(1−φ)
√
2α2−α
(3α−1)+(1−α)φ+2√2α2−α with
∂γ∗δ=δ1
∂α
< 0,
∂γ∗δ=δ1
∂φ
< 0, and γ∗δ=δ1 ≤ γmax < 1 for all α > 12 . Thus we set γ = γ∗ and the ICδ
eff
d
=δ
changes to IC
δ
eff
d
=δ
γ=γ∗ ≥ 0 which holds if δ(α > 12 , φ ≥ 1) ≥ δ1. Again, we have to ignore
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δ2 as we get γ
∗
δ=δ2
= 1−α
αφ
(1+φ)α−(1−φ)√2α2−α
(3α−1)+(1−α)φ−2√2α2−α with
∂γ∗δ=δ2
∂α
> 0 and
∂γ∗δ=δ2
∂φ
< 0. One can
show that γ∗δ=δ2 is larger than γ
max even if we go to the limits with α→ 1
2
and φ→ 1.
The proof of condition (i) can be done in the same way as to the proof of condition
(ii). 
A.2 Chapter 4: Vertical integration and side-payments
A.2.1 Market outcomes
(i) Separation
The inverse linear demand function is given by the equation t = a − b(qDk + qDl).
Each downstream firm Dk with k ∈ {1, 2} gets a price t when it sells the intermediate
product to the final consumers. Its cost is the input price ω only, since marginal costs
of the downstream firms are assumed to be zero. Following this, each downstream firm,
Dk with k ∈ {1, 2}, takes qDl as given and chooses qDk that solves
max
qDk
ΠDk = (t− ω)qDk = ([a− b(qDk + qDl)]− ω)qDk . (A.1)
Since firms are symmetric if all downstream firms are separated, maximization yields
the best-response functions of both downstream firms with
qDk =
a− ω
2b
− qDl
2
. (A.2)
Solving the best-responce functions yields
qDk =
a− ω
3b
. (A.3)
Since the total downstream demand is given by Q = 2qDk = qDk + qDl and – by
assumption – one intermediate product qUi is transformed in one final product, qDk ,
xiv
the inverse demand function for two upstream firms is given by
ω = a− 3bQ
2
= a− 3b(qUi + qUj )
2
. (A.4)
The upstream firms Ui with i ∈ {A,B} have symmetric marginal costs of c. Thus, the
symmetric profit function is given by ΠUi = (ω − c)qUi. The upstream firm Ui takes
qUj as given and chooses qUi that solves
max
qUi
ΠUi = (ω − c)qUi =
([
a− 3b(qUi + qUj)
2
]
− c
)
qUi . (A.5)
The maximization yields in symmetric best-response functions of both upstream firms:
qUi =
a− c
3b
− qUj
2
. (A.6)
Solving this reveals that in equilibrium each upstream firm produces
q∗Ui =
2(a− c)
9b
(A.7)
units of the intermediate product, which has to be equal to the production and selling
of the downstream firms, q∗Dk . Thus, the total quantity of (intermediate and final)
products is given by
QSP =
4(a− c)
9b
. (A.8)
The equilibrium price for the intermediate product and for the final product is then
given by
ωSP =
a+ 2c
3
and tSP =
5a+ 4c
9
. (A.9)
This results in a profit for each upstream firm Ui, with i ∈ {A,B}, of
ΠSPUi =
2(a− c)2
27b
= 96
(a− c)2
1269b
(A.10)
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and a profit for each downstream firm Dk, with k ∈ {1, 2}, of
ΠSPDk =
4(a− c)2
81b
= 64
(a− c)2
1269b
. (A.11)
(ii) Partial integration
Under partial integration only one vertical pair of firms is vertically integrated to a new
firm I. If only Dk integrates with Ui, the upstream unit of I, former upstream firm Ui,
delivers its intermediate products to the former downstream unit Dk for marginal costs
c. Note that the integrated upstream unit will make zero profits from the market by
accepting to integrate, since in the setting assumed above the integrated firm withdraws
from the market for intermediate products. Thus, the former downstream unit, Dk,
has to pay a compensation – a merger fee – to have the ability to get the products by
a price of c. This price is denoted by pki if Dk integrates with Ui. An non-integrated
downstream firm, Dl, has to buy its intermediate products for a price of ω from the
remaining (and now monopolistic) upstream firm Uj. The – now asymmetric – best-
response functions of integrated firm and the remaining separated downstream firm Dl
are then given by
qI =
a− c
2b
− qI
2
and qDl =
a− ω
2b
− qDk
2
. (A.12)
The remaining separated upstream firm Uj only opt for the demand for the remaining
downstream firm Dl. Solving the best-response functions above yields a downstream
demand of
qDl =
a+ c− 2ω
3b
. (A.13)
The inverse demand function of the separated upstream firms is then given by
ω =
a+ c− 3bqDl
2
(A.14)
The supply of upstream units, qUj , has to be equal to the demand of the remaining
downstream market, qDl , in equilibrium. Thus, Uj chooses a supply of an intermediate
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product quantity that solves
max
qUj
ΠUj = (ω − c)qUj =
([
a+ c− 3bqUj
2
]
− c
)
qUj . (A.15)
This yields to the equilibrium quantity of intermediate products on the market of
q∗Uj =
a− c
6b
= q∗Dl. (A.16)
The market price for the intermediate product is then given by
ωPI =
a+ 3c
4
. (A.17)
Due to the best-response functions above, the integrated firm sells a quantity of
q∗I =
a− c
2b
− q
∗
Dl
2
=
5(a− c)
12b
. (A.18)
Thus, the total quantity supplied on the final product market is qual to
QPI = q∗I + q
∗
Dl
=
7(a− c)
12b
, (A.19)
which gives a price for the final products of
tPI = a− bQPI = 5a+ 7c
12
. (A.20)
As a result, the equilibrium profit of the integrated firm is given by
ΠPII = Π
PI
Ui
+ΠPIDk = pki +
(
25(a− c)2
144b
− pki
)
= 225
(a− c)2
1296
. (A.21)
The equilibrium profit of the separated downstream firm Dl results in
ΠPIDl =
4(a− c)2
144b
= 36
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.22)
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and the equilibrium profit of the separated monopolistic upstream firm Uj is
ΠPIUj =
6(a− c)2
144b
= 54
(a− c)2
1296b
. (A.23)
(iii) Full integration
If all firms are vertically integrated no market for the intermediate product exists any-
more. The former upstream firms Ui with i ∈ {A,B}, deliver now the intermediate
products for marginal costs c to its integrated downstream units – the former down-
stream firms Dl with k ∈ {1, 2}. I1 is denoted as the integrated firm consisting of Ui
and Dk, and I2 as the integrated firm consisting of Uj and Dl. Thus, best-response
functions are symmetric and given by
qI1 =
a− c
2b
− qI2
2
and qI2 =
a− c
2b
− qI1
2
. (A.24)
Solving the best-response functions yields
q∗I1 = q
∗
I2
=
a− c
3b
. (A.25)
Thus, the total supply to the downstream market is given by
QFI = q∗I1 + q
∗
I2
=
2(a− c)
3b
, (A.26)
which yields a price for the final consumers of
tFI =
a + 2c
3
. (A.27)
The upstream units have to be compensated for making zero profits now. The corre-
sponding acquisition fees is denoted by pik and pjl. Thus the profit of the integrated
firms is given by
ΠFIIk = Π
FI
Ui
+ΠFIDk = pik +
(
(a− c)2
9b
− pik
)
= 144
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.28)
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and
ΠFIIl = Π
FI
Uj
+ΠFIDl = pjl +
(
(a− c)2
9b
− pjl
)
= 144
(a− c)2
1296b
. (A.29)
(iv) Monopolization
If the market is monopolized, the monopolist has to choose a quantity of final products
that solves
max
qM
ΠM = (t
M − c)qM = ([a− bqM ]− c)qM . (A.30)
Solving this yields a quantity of
q∗ = QM =
a− c
2b
(A.31)
on the market for the final product and to a price of
tM =
a + c
2
. (A.32)
The profit of the monopolist is thus given by
ΠM =
(a− c)2
4b
= 324
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.33)
A.2.2 Welfare analysis
In this section all parameters which are important to compare the welfare results of
each market structure discussed in the paper are calculated: The total profit of the
industry, which is equal to the producers surplus (PS), the consumer surplus (CS)
and the total surplus (TS).
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(i) Separation
PSSP =
∑
ΠSP = 320
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.34)
CSSP =
(
a− tSP )QSP
2
= 128
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.35)
TSSP = PSSP + CSSP = 448
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.36)
(ii) Partial integration
PSPI =
∑
ΠPI = 315
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.37)
CSPI =
(
a− tPI)QPI
2
= 220.5
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.38)
TSPI = PSPI + CSPI = 535.5
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.39)
(iii) Full integration
PSFI =
∑
ΠFI = 288
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.40)
CSFI =
(
a− tFI)QFI
2
= 288
(a− c)2
288b
(A.41)
TSFI = PSFI + CSFI = 576
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.42)
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(iv) Monopolization
PSM = ΠM = 324
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.43)
CSM =
(
a− tM)QM
2
= 162
(a− c)2
288b
(A.44)
TSM = PSM + CSM = 486
(a− c)2
1296b
(A.45)
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